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THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD ONCE MORE

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PRESUMABLY one does not have to apologise for returning to this much-canvassed question, unless it be to those who think that, on one side or the other, the definite answer has been given. Yet one is hardly called upon to beg pardon of anyone capable of such easy optimism or such hard prejudice. And any discussion of this subject can scarcely avoid, or wish to avoid, some reference to the views of Sir David Ross. Indeed, I intend to make free reference to his views as a framework for a plea for the necessary dependence of the right upon the good, and of the ought-to-do upon the ought-to-be, though this latter topic will not be developed explicitly in the present paper.

My fundamental disagreement with Ross is in regard to the dualism (or the pluralism within a dualism) which he accepts in ethical theory and in the moral life. I am not sure whether he accepts this situation without regret, though one would think that any philosopher who is so respectful of reason and its demands would accept dualism, or pluralism, only *faute de mieux*. Thus, we are told that "the moral order expressed in the propositions [concerning *prima facie* rightness] is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe (and, we may add, of any possible universe in which there were moral agents at all) as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. In our confidence that these propositions are true there is involved the same trust in our reason that is involved in our confidence in mathematics; and we should have no justifi-

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cation for trusting it in the latter sphere and distrusting it in the former" (*The Right and the Good*, pp. 29-30). We are told again, in similar vein, that "both in mathematics and in ethics we have certain crystal-clear intuitions from which we build up all that we can know about the nature of numbers and the nature of duty" (*Foundations of Ethics*, p. 144). Now, if there is anything characteristic of reason and of a rational universe, it is that it should be at one and not at odds with itself; and if we cannot fully discover this unity in many cases (e.g., between the moral and the mathematical), the fault must lie in our imperfect use of reason and not in the rationality of the universe itself. While admitting that unity is so far unknown, we shall shrink from affirming that it is in principle unknowable. This, I repeat, is what might be expected from a rationalist such as Ross seems to be, though I say nothing of empiricists in general or of logical positivists in particular. We should hope for something better from Ross than the contention that it is "a mistake in principle to think that there is any presumption in favour of the truth of a monistic against a pluralistic theory in morals, or, for that matter, in metaphysics either. When we are faced with two or more ostensible grounds of rightness, it is proper to examine them to find whether they have a single character in common; but if we cannot find one we have no reason to assume that our failure is due to the weakness of our thought and not to the nature of the facts" (*F.E.*, p. 83). How can it be other than a mistake in the principle of thinking (which presumably is rational) about the "fundamental nature of the universe" to leave it an option as to whether there is indeed a fundamental nature and not rather a plurality of natures? Nor is it satisfactory to say that entities may have a similar form or structure, of rationality, and yet differ so much in their factual content as to be mutually independent. Further, we may properly require a "single character in common" to mathematics and morality but not within morality itself. And I find difficulty in grasping the sense of the statement that if we cannot find one we have *no reason*

to assume that our failure is due to the weakness of our thought and not to the nature of the facts.

But let us turn from these general considerations to look at what Ross calls "the nature of the facts". I want to do this first of all in terms of his favourite example of promise-keeping, which is to him also the leading instance of a duty independent of the duty of promoting good generally. What I propose to show, partly from Ross's own description but also from the nature of the facts, is that there is and can be no such independence.

(1) In his examination of promises, Ross conforms to a common procedure, in that he assumes always that the promise *has already been made*, and never goes behind this stage; he is interested in what follows from promise-making but not in what has led up to it. When examination of the matter is commenced at this stage, it is relatively easy to emphasise not only the obligation which arises from having given one's word, but also the sole dependence of the obligation upon this pledge. As soon, however, as we ask: but why was the promise—any promise—made in the first place? (assuming that it was made voluntarily), the whole situation appears in a new light. We can suppose that no one makes a promise just for the sake of putting himself under the obligation which it creates, for this would be to turn a very usual practice into a most unusual moral athleticism; nor need it be done as a kind of ethical experiment, save by some moral philosopher who has rarely or never made a promise before.

When I make a promise, I pledge myself to do some service or benefit to the promisee, and this service or benefit is, of course, some form of *good*. Prior to this, there is some reason or other which makes me think of making the promise, but there is the fundamental desire to do some good to the other person. The situation is not quite the same as with the other independent obligations to which Ross refers, of making reparation for a wrong and of grateful response to a benefit. A promise by contrast is "an uncovenanted mercy" arising spontaneously out of the good will of the promiser, and to

meet what is believed to be some need of the promisee. So before I promise to take my nephew to the circus on a certain date and time, it has occurred to me that he will regard it as good to see the circus, and that it really is good for him or any child to see it. If I believe that this child is of such a temperament that the circus will upset him and do him more harm than good, I will decide against taking him and so against telling him that I will do so. The actual telling or making of the promise is consequent upon a decision as to the goodness of what is to be promised. May I also point out, as a matter of later relevance, that the actions of my nephew or myself which cause him to be seated around the ring are not properly to be called "good", for the proper attribution to these is "right"; it is rather the experience of witnessing the performance which is "good", and this experience is a continuous and perhaps cumulative whole of mental quality, and so different in character from any acts which function to produce it causally, including the acts of the performers.

How, then, can it be validly held that the making and keeping of a promise involves an obligation independent of any obligation to do good? The obligation arises originally out of the judgment that it is good for the child to see the circus, together with my willingness and ability to take him. That is, I see an opportunity to do some good, and this leads to the acknowledgment that I ought to do it and to tell my nephew that I will do it. No doubt my obligation is reinforced by this telling, but it is not originated by it. Prior to the recognition that I ought to keep a promise is the recognition that I ought to make it, and I do not see how this second-named "ought" is independent of the good which it is to subserve. If all this is not so, how does Ross or anyone else explain the situation wherein, after reflection, I decide not to pledge myself to another because the contemplated action would be a disservice to him? It would be wrong, I decide, just because it would be a disservice. I do not know if Ross would object here, by saying that while there is one identical obligation in every promise, arising simply from the making

of it, there is a wide variety of things that are promised as good, so that the one identical obligation cannot be grounded on such a varied basis. This, however, would not square with his admission that obligations, presumably identical in kind, do properly arise in many instances out of goods to be produced, these goods having a similar wide variety.

There might be one way of trying to maintain the independent rightness of promise-keeping, while admitting that a promise in the making takes account of some benefit to be conferred. This would be by contending that there are two separate and independent obligations but only one goodness; that one obligation is grounded on the goodness of the benefit, the other being based on, and only on, the pledge given to confer this benefit. It could be added that the goodness of the benefit is taken into account and plays its part in creating the first obligation, and that it may not be used twice over in creating the second obligation, for which the given pledge is sufficient ground. This, I think, would be a misreading of the situation, in which we normally say that there are not two obligations but one only; or perhaps we could say that the one obligation has a twofold reference, in that it lies upon the promiser in respect both of the good to be conferred and of the person on whom it is to be conferred. It is artificial to have two *independent* obligations for the one action. What happens, rather, is that the second obligation absorbs, as it presupposes, the first: it is not added to or even substituted for it, but enlarges it into a more complex obligation, i.e., into a more complex "ought" relationship. But perhaps Ross himself would not argue in this fashion. In one place he cites an instance where a promise is made to a father in respect of his son, but I do not remember that he points to two separate obligations, one to the father and the other to the son. No more, then, should he be able to point to a third obligation, i.e., to the first in temporal order, in respect of the good to be done and therefore promised. The whole obligation is a complex relationship according to the formula:

A is under (one) obligation to B to confer the benefit X upon C.

There could be still another line of objection to my interpretation, taking the form of a denial that there need be any "first" obligation at all, especially when a promise is made on the initiative of the promiser. I may recognise that my nephew would like to see the circus, and I promise to take him just because I would like to do so and not from any sense of duty. The situation can thus be expressed in terms of *liking* throughout, and this avoids a moralising interpretation of it where none is warranted. Now, while I sympathise with the desire to avoid moralising every human decision, I refrain from treating this aspect of the present case, partly because it would require a long discussion to deal with it properly (including questions as to whether there are decisions involving obligations of a non-moral kind and even some which involve no obligation or "ought" of any kind); and partly because the imagined objection may be otherwise disposed of. For what has to be noted is that I have made a promise to my nephew, and this, no matter what went on in my mind beforehand, has created a situation with the same moral significance as if I had decided to promise, not out of liking, but from a sense of duty. The promise has created an expectation in my nephew's mind, and he now relies on me to fulfil it. From his point of view it is all one whether or not I went through a process of ethical deliberation before making the promise, and for this very reason it must also be all one to me. What he is excitedly aware of is that good thing that lies in prospect, and of me as the reliable means of bringing it to pass for him. I must therefore be aware of myself in the same way, not merely as trustworthy but as trustworthy in a certain specific direction. Thus I so far agree with Ross that in such a case the obligation arises out of giving the promise, but disagree with him in holding that, as the promise creates an expectation of good in the promisee, it *for that reason* obliges me to fulfil it. It may be added that the liking element has not

been eliminated but has been caught up in the sense of obligation: one can like doing that to which duty points.

As far as I can make out, Ross nowhere gives a definition of a promise, or at any rate a satisfactory definition. He seems to get near to it when he says (*F.E.*, p. 76) that "a promise is just the voluntary making of something obligatory on us which would not, or need not, have been obligatory before". He says this in connexion with a distinction between making a promise and announcing an intention. If the foregoing statement was meant as a definition it would be manifestly inadequate. If a married man becomes a father, by more or less voluntary action, he has assumed an obligation or obligations to his child which he would not or need not have acknowledged before, but it would be a stretching of both language and fact to allege that he has made a promise. We should not think him to be discharged from obligation if, though he contracted marriage on the understanding with his wife that they should have no children, yet a child did come along. Moreover, we can voluntarily assume obligations to posterity, but again it is a stretching of usual and admissible meaning to maintain that we can or do make promises to persons who will not begin to exist until after we are dead. (I suggest in passing that the "sacred" obligation usually felt towards keeping a promise towards someone who subsequently dies is sufficiently explained in the following way: we feel that extra care is incumbent upon us not to be lax in performance now that the expectant eye of the promisee is no longer upon us; we would not like the reproach, even the self-reproach, of keeping a promise only when we are watched.)

(2) If Ross had essayed a strict definition of a promise, he would have found it impossible to construct without embedding in it a reference to the good to be secured by it; but this, of course, would have knocked the bottom out of his claim about an obligation independent of the obligation to do good. Moreover—and this is my second main point—he would have had to define a promise so as to make it exclude a

threat. In a loose usage it may be possible to extend the nature of promises so as to cover threats, and this usage comes out in such a statement as "I have promised to give him a good hiding if he bites his nails again". But if a threat is a promise, it is so negatively or in reverse, so to say. More strictly, it differs in being an announcement of a reliable intention to do (not good but) harm to someone. I introduce the word "reliable" to meet Ross's point that a promise is an intimation to another on which he can rely. But if the differentia is not in respect of reliability, or of declared intention about future action—in all of which respects promises and threats are identical—then it must lie in the good or evil results which are intended and declared.

Ross might take *in limine* objection to the introduction of threats into this discussion on the ground that he deals with a promise as an instance of the morally obligatory, whereas there is no obligation on anyone either to make a threat or to keep it when made. He certainly does say that there is a more stringent obligation to refrain from doing evil than to do positive good; and a threat concerns the doing of evil, or of what the threatened person regards as such. On second thoughts perhaps Ross would not raise the second part of this objection, but it is worth looking at for a while all the same.

Is it true that there is never a moral obligation to make a threat? If it is, then can we justify the threats contained in so much of our legislation, and can we stop short at any position this side of anarchism? Punishment, legal or other, and no matter how transformed to meet the demands of the reformation theory (unless it is transformed out of recognition) must retain a character that is unwelcome to the one on whom it is imposed; in some way it is a forcible interference in his life and behaviour. Legal punishment may be called a conditional threat, in that it operates only if someone breaks the law. But then a promise may also be conditional, as in "I promise to take you to the circus if you eat your vegetables every night". In this promise there is implied an undesirable consequence—a consequential threat

if you like—for the promisee; but in the legal threat there is implied a desirable consequence for those who observe the law, contained in the presumably good result which the law is enacted to secure. It appears as if a threat may be justifiable on the assumption that it is connected with and is a means towards the realization of some *good*; and in so far as we regard such a threat as a form of promise, it is not independent of the good to be realised.

In theory, threats may be of three kinds. I may threaten someone with harm (a) if he does some specified act in the future, (b) because he has done some specified act in the past, or (c) quite apart from what he will do in the future or what he has done in the past. This third kind will strike us as a purely theoretical possibility, or as possible only with persons who are pathological, so we may disregard it. Of type (a) we have taken some account already, and have asserted that it is justifiable and involves obligation if it is within the context of some good to be produced or expressed. This condition needs to be inserted, but it also needs to be amplified. It is not any good that will justify such a threat or make its performance obligatory, or perhaps we should say that it is only genuine good that will do this. When a black-mailer uses intimidation, he usually does so for what he assumes, and for what to some extent really is, his own benefit, but it is a benefit that he is not entitled to receive. In so far as his action comes within type (a), he threatens to expose his victim if this person does not, at some near future time, pay his price for silence. His conduct could only begin to have a semblance of justification if it came into type (b), i.e., if he thought of himself as an instrument of justice in respect of some *past* misdeed of his victim. In such case, however, he would not use blackmail as his method, and he would run counter to the larger and accepted conception of good, according to which the public good is better served by the public rather than the private administration of justice. So even in this doubtful kind of case, and giving it the most favourable interpretation, it is not possible to

avoid goodness as bearing directly on the rightness or wrongness of the action.

One remembers, of course, that the law takes no cognisance of many forms of moral wrong-doing, and that it sometimes permits or requires behaviour which a sensitive conscience repudiates. Without going into the issues which are raised by all this, it is sufficient to say that if in such cases a sensitive conscience feels driven to the point of threats, of either physical or "moral" suasion, this line of action *qua* conscientious will be in the name of goodness in some general respect. A rebel would have to be pathological if he did not justify his revolutionary threats in some such way.

So we come to type (b), where a threat is made in respect of some wrong-doing that has already been done. Has the one who issues the threat any right to do so, or any duty to carry it out after he has made it? He could attempt to justify himself on either the psychological or the ethical plane; i.e., he could point to his resentment at the injury suffered, as a wound in his self-esteem or prestige, or to the "natural" propriety or justice of paying back an offender in his own coin. The former of these pleas is, of course, no justification, but what of the other? As Ross does not deal with this kind of thing, we must more or less guess at his answer. Perhaps he would condemn the retaliation by his principle that there is a more stringent obligation against causing pain than in favour of causing pleasure, though he admits that this principle will not apply if an action causing pain is clearly the most stringent obligation in the circumstances. Ross does not explain the ethical status of the principle or whence it is derived, but I cannot see how it can be got by direct intuition, since it includes a comparison of valuation as between causing pleasure and pain. This mode of valuation can be made only by comparing pleasure and pain as two results of action, i.e., by a utilitarian comparison. Moreover, all this involves consideration of the retaliatory threat before it is made.

Two other lines could possibly be followed by Ross. In the one he could say that a threat of revenge is to be condemned because it expresses a bad state of mind or character in the one who makes it. But this is to get behind the act to its motive or even to the permanent disposition, and thus from a right action to that which is morally *good* and beyond this to a *good* character. So this line of thought leads to goodness as that which a person desires to produce or is permanently set on producing. If we remember that Ross exalts the sense of duty above all other motives, so that it is *the* characteristic of the morally good man, and that this motive is itself characterised by the fact that it is the desire to do what is right (and not produce what is good) for its own sake, then there are two counter-considerations. One is in Ross's admission that the ideally good man will be moved by other motives in addition to the sense of duty; the other arises from what is a remarkable statement by Ross in view of his general position: "Action from the sense of duty thus involves the thought that there is a duty to do a particular act, not because if done it will be done from a sense of duty, but because it will have a particular character such as that of maximising the good in the world. And it can hardly be claimed that it is our duty to act from a mistaken thought; so that the very claim that we ought to act from a sense of duty involves the thought that there are duties other than that of acting from a sense of duty, acts the obligatoriness of which does not rest on the nature of the motive from which they will be done" (*F.E.*, p. 118). In other words, the sense of duty has to be reinforced by the desire to secure some good through the dutiful act. If this is so, it is artificial to assert that these two components or factors of the good act are independent, and Ross plainly does not mean here that the goodness of the act is derivative from its prior rightness as simply dutiful.

In so far as character or moral disposition is brought into the account, we have something which needs further

attention relatively to Ross's standpoint, but this must be deferred for the present.

The other possible line for Ross is to maintain that the extra stringency of avoiding injury to another is just one of those intuitions which his theory in general makes so prominent. It does seem as if the maxim "in for a penny, in for a pound" does apply to a pluralism such as that of Ross, and that it leads him to violate Occam's rule of parsimony and to be set on a rake's progress. It also is in conflict with the remark that "we seem to be driven to conclude that there is not one single ground of the rightness of all right acts; but the number of separate grounds appears to be quite small" (*F.E.*, p. 320). Our attention is to be diverted from the doubtful birth of the offspring by being asked to notice that it is only a very little one. It might appear on a superficial reading as if we are to be limited to four or perhaps five basic intuitions as to (1) the general maximising of good, (2) keeping promises, (3) showing gratitude, (4) making reparation, and perhaps (5) acting justly. But it seems to be Ross's intention, as it is certainly in accord with his theory, that any clashes between any two or more of these five are resolved by intuitive decisions, whose number thus becomes indefinitely large. In addition, we have intuitive awareness of degrees of rightness itself, the case now before us seeming to come under this heading. There is thus a great variety of the grounds of rightness of right acts, and yet "the act which a man in any situation ought to do is that which it would be *reasonable* [Ross's italics] for him to do if he wanted to do his duty in that situation" (*F.E.*, p. 156). I have contended already that reason displays itself in some unity of system, in which a variety of content has some common ground. It is a travesty of reason to portray it as having its essence only in the unity or commonness to the neglect and virtual denial of the variety; and it would be a travesty of the rationality of the moralised life to portray it in any such fashion, or to deny that there is a subordinate though necessary operation of intuitive judgment (Aristotle's

practical wisdom) in applying the common rule to the variety of particular cases. But it is an equal travesty to depict the moralised life as based on a set of independent rules or intuitions, and yet to insist on its rationality. No one has emphasised more than Aristotle the varied content of moral living, yet this did not deter him from the conviction that this content has a single basis—not in mere rationality but in this as expressed through the good life for man. It is then a further task for thought to see this good life in turn as an expression of the rational in its largest sweep, and as cohering with the other main expressions of rationality which we acknowledge.

So far as I can discover, Ross gives no more than an independent intuitive basis for the special stringency of the obligation to refrain from doing evil to another, and if the instance of revenge comes under this head it partakes of the independence. But this forces us to subject the matter to further scrutiny. We are to hold, presumably, that we have intuitive certainty that revenge and therefore a retaliatory threat is wrong, or a certainty which is only a short remove from an intuition. Yet we remember that mankind have not all or always had such a conviction. The *lex talionis* is ancient and has received widespread recognition; it has been dignified with the name of *lex*, and has even been given divine sanction, as with the ancient Jews. It was a revolutionary idea to these Jews when Jesus told them: "But I say unto you, resist not him that is evil . . . love your enemies and pray for them that persecute you", and this in deliberate contrast to the eye for an eye principle. In spite of this weighty admonition the hoary old principle is still far from dead, and many would be ready to insist that it is "only natural and right" to act by it when there is no municipal or international law and reign of law to transform individual or national revenge into public justice.

Now, while objecting strongly to relativism as the final word on moral living—indeed I hold it to be absurd—yet I as strongly contend for a subordinate relativism, without whose

recognition the moral experience of mankind does not make sense. One way of describing this relativism is in terms of the subjective rightness (sense C) which Ross admits in Chapter 7 of *Foundations of Ethics*—that which a man thinks right in the circumstances as he sees them; or in terms of Ewing's second sense of "ought" in Chapter 4 of his "Definition of Good"—that we ought to do what we believe to be right. What this means in our present context is that the *lex talionis*, though condemned and superseded by the best moral insight, can be and has been valid for a more imperfect insight, so that men could do rightly and be good in carrying out its precepts. Ross gives no recipe for the improvement of moral insight, and indeed has little to say on this elsewhere in his book, though in one place he does mention (what is of great importance) that goodness, like happiness, tends to radiate out from one person to another (p. 174). Presumably he would add that there are some outstanding persons who radiate goodness with revolutionary effect, since he remarks that "every now and then there arises in the course of history a genius who discovers some great moral truth which only needs to be proclaimed to be generally recognised; and all who come under his influence find their whole moral insight lifted to a higher plane" (p. 20). And he does insist on the educability of conscience, which implies its possible and relative validity at every stage of its individual or social development.

It should be plain by now that I am not maintaining that the moral intuition (if this was the means) by which men once accepted the *lex talionis*, and the later intuition by which they or some of them rejected it, are equally worthy of respect. But I do want to know if it is possible to advance from a less to a more perfect insight by attending only to rightness in the strict sense and not also to goodness. I want to know if the two intuitions, the earlier and the later, have nothing in common, or if there is not rather some common basis whereby a passage may be made from the one to the other. The method of Jesus was not philosophic, and so we

cannot be sure as to what happened in his mind. Fortunately, however, we have an account of what happened in the mind of another moral genius when he dealt with the same problem. I refer, of course, to Socrates and to the report of his argument in the First Book of the *Republic*. "Justice", said Polemarchus, "is to help your friends and harm your enemies". Socrates accepted the first part of this but rejected the second, for it is not the nature of a just man to harm any human being whatever but rather to do him good. Elsewhere (in the *Gorgias*) Socrates asserts that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it, or rather he infers this from the admission by Polus that to commit injustice is more ugly than to suffer it. His argument turns on the admitted identity of ugliness with evil and of beauty with goodness. In both cases goodness is invoked as the pivot of the argument to determine what it is right to do. More strictly there is a display of a superior goodness which compels the admission of a consequential superior rightness. We may see in the *Gorgias* passage an interpretation by Plato of the death of Socrates, whereby he who seemed to have been conquered by his unjust enemies was in reality triumphant through his unquenchable good will and his steadfast righteousness.

It will not do to object that I have begged the very question at issue by these Greek examples, since the Greeks took for granted what is now in dispute, namely, the moral measurement of all conduct in terms of the good to be achieved in or by it. This assumption was at least common to both sides in the Greek dispute, and it was also the means by which the solution was found. I am now submitting that it is the only means by which it may be found. Certain it is that the *lex talionis* has been seen through by acute minds; to what did they see through? Their minds did not move from one apparent rightness of conduct to another that was quite independent of it, but this they would have to do on a strictly Rossian basis. Whenever an appearance gives way to a reality, what actually happens is that a less adequate appearance gives way to a more adequate appearance of the self-

same reality. And of those who insist that, in a case like this, apprehension of rightness is independent of apprehension of goodness, it may be asked: What cogent alternative explanation can you offer of the advance from *lex talionis* to the insight of Socrates or Jesus? In particular, will your explanation be like that of Socrates in taking the form of argument? If so, how will you move by inference from one independently apprehended rightness to the other?

(3) I come at length to the third main consideration of the supposedly independent obligations, i.e., when any one of them comes into conflict with another or with the general obligation to produce goodness. This has been glanced at already in passing, but we must now look at it more squarely. What I will aim to show is that such conflict cannot be resolved, and in fact is not resolved, except through reference to goodness.

Of course, it is the intuitionist principle which Ross lays down as the means whereby to come to a decision in a "divided duty" situation, where one of his independent obligations is on one side of the division. (It will be recalled that he admits the utilitarian method when none of these obligations is involved in a conflict.) So let us consider first of all the case of two promises which get in each other's way. I give an imaginary example which is somewhat artificial, but which will serve, I think, to bring out the necessary features. A father of limited means has promised well beforehand that he will give his daughter a substantial gift on her next birthday, which will be her twenty-first. Soon after making the promise he has to borrow money to meet an emergency, and he gets it from a friend who he knows will need repayment without undue delay. But such repayment will effectually prevent the father from giving the promised gift to his daughter until well after her birthday; and though he can defer repaying the loan until after this date, this will cause serious embarrassment to the lender. How should the father decide what he ought to do?

According to Ross he should balance against each other, to the best of his ability, the two *prima facie* obligations in respect of their stringencies, until he feels sure from this direct comparison which of them is the more stringent. This resultant actual obligation, whichever it is, will be to keep a promise, i.e., it will be an obligation to do something because it is right and not because of any goodness in the effects. Strictly, therefore, his previous comparison should not make reference to any goodness relative to either of the competing promises, and this, of course, is what Ross requires because of his view of the independent duty of promise-keeping. Moreover, if the comparison did bring into question the goodness relative to each promise, it would be pertinent to ask why there should be no question of goodness in the resultant obligation, which in this instance, be it noted, is itself to keep a promise.

Looking more closely, however, at Ross's position, it would seem that he does admit the question of goodness relatively to the resultant and actual obligation. This comes out in the section of *Foundations of Ethics* (pp. 83-86) where he distinguishes between *prima facie* obligations, or responsibilities, and actual resultant obligations. Promise-keeping is *prima facie* obligatory, he says, in respect only of one aspect of the promise, that is, as a keeping of one's pledged word, whereas actual obligation arises out of the totality of its aspects. Now as the other ethically relevant aspects can only concern goodness, the rightness aspect being already accounted for, it is pertinent to ask why actual obligation, in this case of promise keeping, should have some regard to relevant goodness, whereas prior to decision this same promise, as well as the competing one, is not to be weighted in respect of its goodness aspects. But if nothing more could be said on this kind of case, we come upon the significant admission of the necessary relation between an actual obligation and its goodness aspect.

More, however, can be said, and as a result of our continued scrutiny of Ross's view. For he also says that when one

prima facie obligation is weighed against another, "we are only bound to do that act whose *prima facie* obligatoriness in those respects in which it is obligatory most outweighs its disobligatoriness in those respects in which it is *prima facie* disobligatory". A little later we are told that promise-breaking remains morally unsuitable even when we have decided that it is actually obligatory. It has been remarked already that the disobligatory aspect of keeping a particular promise must be its attendant goodness or badness, especially in comparison with aspects of similar nature in the competing promise. This feature of either promise presumably does not call for consideration if it is not challenged by the other, or by any other, *prima facie* obligation—though this, according to my previous argument, is for a reason which Ross neglects, namely, that the goodness resulting from keeping the promise has already been considered before it was made. But when one promise is challenged by another, both of them have to be looked at and weighed in all their aspects, including that which presents the goodness or badness of their consequences. Badness will now come into consideration, since to keep the promise to A will have bad results for B, and *vice versa*, and these bad results will be additional to the bad impression made on A or B by not keeping the promise to one or other of them. Note that I say a "bad" and not "a morally wrong" impression, for the latter expression would be unusual linguistically and unjustifiable in fact. A promisee's expectation may be called right or rightful, and the promiser's fulfilment of that obligation may be called right and his non-fulfilment wrong; but what the promiser *does* in such fulfilment (or omits in non-fulfilment) is good, usually of the non-moral kind, while the doing of this non-moral good has a moral effect for good on the recipient, just as even more strikingly the omission of the non-moral good has a moral effect for evil on him. I am persuaded that, for the purposes of ethics, this kind of effect in the way of moral goodness is the one feature in men's moral relationships which should

have most emphasis, and certainly much more emphasis than it is wont to receive from contemporary writers who concentrate on actions and on their rightness and wrongness. It is significant that such writers give very secondary attention to traditional ethical topics such as character, virtue and the virtues.

In the light of all this, let us return to our neglected imaginary example, and let us suppose that the father decides to give his daughter the promised gift and to defer repayment of the loan. We will assume that he will have explained the situation to his creditor, and will have impressed upon him that his deferring of repayment does not mean that he takes this responsibility lightly. In so doing he will have tried, and possibly with success as between friends, to convince the other that his default is no sign of badness of character; for if the creditor were not so convinced, he might become dubious as to when or even whether his debtor would do right by him. The father will also have come to the conclusion that the creditor's temporary loss of the non-moral good (the money) will inflict a non-moral evil on him which is less than the moral good to be conferred on his daughter at her birthday, to say nothing of the non-moral good (the gift) she will receive. This involves a comparison of moral with non-moral good; but however difficult this comparison may be in some cases, my present point is that it is *goodness* which figures on both sides of it. This, of course, is covered by Ross's "other aspects" that are ethically relevant. And may I say here that my advocacy of the necessary reference to goodness in moral deliberation and decision is not due to any supposition of the easiness of comparing goods, moral and/or non-moral, or that such comparison is easier to make than the kind which Ross's doctrine requires, that is, of obligatory stringencies. I suspect that the method which I advocate is easier in practical application than that of Ross, and I have tried to show, indeed, that Ross cannot remain faithful to his method in its strictness; but whether easier or not, some

reference to and comparison of goodness is inescapable when we keep close to the facts of an actual situation.

I refrain from pursuing my imaginary example in any other of its ramifications, or from going any further into the attendant theoretical considerations, since I think that what has been done in these ways should suffice for the purpose in hand. Moreover, I will refrain from any detailed discussion of the kind of situation where the keeping of a promise conflicts either with another independent responsibility or with one which arises out of a good to be secured. Any such discussion would involve, as part of it, conclusions as to promise-keeping similar to those just put forward. But I do want to make a short examination of the responsibility to make reparation for past wrong-doing, this being one of Ross's independent *prima facie* obligations, and one moreover which may well seem to give strong support to his claims about it. What I want to say about this kind of responsibility, and about its necessary reference to goodness, can be brought out without the trouble of comparing it with some competing responsibility.

There does seem to be a particularly binding responsibility to make reparation for former injurious conduct. If I have brought pain or loss on someone in the past, then it is "up to me" in a peculiarly stringent way to make it up to him. It would seem to be more difficult to find adequate grounds for evading this responsibility than it is to find them for evading the keeping of a promise. I am therefore prepared to go all the way with Ross in recognising the stringency of this obligation, though I am not prepared to think that this stringency can be felt or understood without reference to goodness or badness, both moral and non-moral.

First let us notice the inadequacy of my description of the situation a few lines back, for much more is involved than the bringing of pain or loss on someone in the past. I may have done this without needing to feel any responsibility as to reparation. As a parent I have frequently brought

both pain and loss to my children, and for at least a great many of such actions I acknowledge no responsibility to make reparation, nor do my children feel (as far as I can make out) that they have a right to it. Ethel Mannin has remarked somewhere that every child recognises and respects a good healthy rage. Nor is this latter expression question-begging, unless we are to question the rightfulness of punishment as such; and I have glanced at this matter in an earlier part of this paper. But I freely admit that there were occasions when I "punished" my children either unjustifiably or over-severely, and the unjustifiable occasions should not be dignified with the name of punishment. Moreover my children have sometimes recalled these occasions and have expressed themselves freely about them. On some of them I quickly realised my mistake and tried immediately to make up for my wrong-doing. I realise, however, that what I must chiefly rely on, in the way of reparation, is not any particular compensatory action but my predominant attitude to my children (together with the appropriate behaviour), and also upon their recognition of this general attitude of goodwill. A "good healthy rage" is recognised as good only under this same condition. And I flatter myself—I hope without smugness—that this general goodwill has impressed itself upon my children, and that otherwise they would not now feel free to twit me about it without rancour on either side. This suggests that the essential form of reparation is in *being* something to the wronged person much more than in doing something to or for him, that reparation lies more in being or becoming good than in doing right, though this does not mean that reparative right-doing is to be neglected. It rather means that such right-doing can be expected only from a wrongdoer who has become aware of his fault and has repented of it. It is only for such a reason that it will be really right and not merely prudential; so that rightness here is consequent on goodness, and not *vice versa*, as Ross holds in all cases of independent obligation.

The question of forgiveness is relevant, and the condition under which it is properly extended to an offender. Of course, forgiveness is something which proceeds from the offended, and the necessary condition is that the offender is genuinely repentant. It can be argued, very strongly I think, that if a community or its officials could be sure about any law-breaker that he has suffered a genuine change of mind and heart, so that he now sides with the law against himself, it could at once dispense him from suffering punishment; though in practice it is, of course, impossible with our present knowledge to be sure of this in any given case. Moreover, it would powerfully assist offenders towards repentance were they so treated as to be able to become aware of the community's predominant goodwill towards them in the operation of the law against them. In a word, goodness rather than specific right-doing—and on the part of both offender and offended—is what matters most. This is in accord with majority Christian opinion as I understand it, namely, that even God can forgive only the forgivable, and that a person is forgivable only if he truly repents. Has he then a right to such forgiveness? Perhaps he has, though we should suspect the genuineness of his penitence if he insisted on this right. An equally pertinent question is whether God or any offended party is under obligation to forgive the truly repentant. In the Christian position as I see it there is such an obligation on God, but it is grounded on and expressive of his goodness. Behind this again is the goodness which consists in God and men existing in mutual fellowship and confidence, which is commonly expressed in terms of the family relation of father and children. All who are or can be parties to this fellowship—which is the supreme good—are under obligation to express its spirit in their behaviour to one another; so that while men may not forgive God, they are called upon to forgive one another as God for Christ's sake has forgiven them. Whether we take all this as literal truth or as pleasant myth, it does reinforce the connexion

of goodness with reparation in the way of ground and consequence.

When we look into a case of making reparation for wrong, we can see that it is understandable in a way and to a degree that the alleged pure intuition of it would seem to preclude. It may be analysed in a typical instance into the following elements: (a) In the past I have done a wrong to X, by (b) causing him loss or pain in some respect, which (c) I had no moral justification for inflicting; but (d) later I realise the truth of (c), and so (e) decide that I must rectify (b) as far as possible, and thus also rectify (a). The rectification takes the form of a benefit which X will regard as adequate compensation for the disbenefit formerly received. A complication would arise if X were to be exorbitant in his expectations, but we may neglect this except in so far as it implies that the compensation should be a just one. There will also be cases where adequate compensation in kind is impossible, but we can assume Ross's agreement to the principle that "ought" implies "can", and no more than "can".

Notice first that in the foregoing analysis (a) is dependent on (b), i.e., the ground of my doing wrong to X is the unjustifiable causing of loss or pain to him. There is no intuition here other than a fundamental one for morality, that recognition of something as bad carries the obligation to avoid bringing it into existence. Of course, (d) also is consequential on (a) and (b), in that apart from them I would now be under no obligation to confer on X the benefit which I decide upon. It thus might seem that the good which I do to X, that is, my decision to do it, arises solely out of my recognised obligation to him, and perhaps this is how Ross would look at it, since in such cases he insists on goodness being consequential on rightness. Certainly my obligation to do some good to X in the way of reparation does not arise simply out of the future goodness which X is to receive, but it does arise, I submit, out of this goodness as compensation for evil which he has formerly received from me. In other

words, my obligation looks to the future and to the past, and to the one because of the other, and what it looks to ultimately in each direction is some good or its negation. The situation is unduly simplified if it is represented as presenting a present action which is right independently of any good to be produced and arising directly out of a past act which was wrong independently of any badness it caused. If I had not caused badness to begin with, the whole situation would not have arisen. The relevance of the past badness and the later goodness (and also their connexion) is evident in the subordinate obligation to make reparation *in kind* wherever this is possible. If I caused loss of material goods, then I am to compensate in this way, as with conscience money. If I unjustifiably prevented X from getting a position for which he was fitted (here I have an actual case in mind), then I make reparation by getting him another, and if possible similar position. This emphasis on compensation in kind reflects the emphasis on the good-bad elements in the situation as distinct from yet determinative of the right-wrong elements therein.

But moral as well as non-moral good also enters into consideration. This becomes clear if I make reparation to X simply to put him right with me and because I want to make use of him for some purpose of my own, and not to put myself right with him. In taking this self-regarding line I do not need to recognise the wrongness of my past act, and so I shall not now be doing right even if my reparation is as complete as it could be under the opposite and better condition. Ross would say that it is right but morally bad, whereas I submit that it is wrong and that what would make it right would be the purpose on my part to express moral goodness in myself, as a now reformed character, and to produce moral goodness or a favourable attitude to it in X. For the ethical badness in my original act included the giving occasion to X to have a diminished faith in human goodness, and the core of my reparation is in doing what I can to restore that faith. If I were to make reparation simply out of self-regard, it is likely

that I would simulate genuine repentance for my former misdeed, since I know that a moral effect on X is part of genuine reparation. This appropriate attitude or motive is all the more necessary when it is impossible to make reparation in kind. If it is not possible to make reparation in *any* kind, X may be ready to take the will for the deed, responding to my protestations of deep regret with an assurance that he will think no more of the matter and will let bygones be bygones. In such a situation, the relevant good is only of the moral kind and not at all non-moral; but the moral good expressed by me and accepted by X is the basis of the rightness of such limited action as I can perform.

The importance of motive or attitude, and therewith of moral good, is evident also in regard to promise-keeping. It draws attention to the manner in which I keep a promise. Suppose that, after wavering as to whether I shall take my nephew to the circus because of a counter-attraction (whether obligatory or not), I decide to carry out my promise. I may then do this in a disgruntled manner which is obvious to my nephew. In every other respect I may not fail of what I had promised: I take the boy to the circus and return him safe and sound. But I run the risk of shaking his faith in my goodwill, and it is even possible that he may decide on balance that he would rather not have been taken in such a manner. Ross would have to say that my action, despite its grudgingness, was right as fulfilling my voluntarily incurred obligation. I prefer to say that it was wrong in so far as qualified by the badness which I dwell on as accruing from it. There is a similarity here to making reparation or paying a debt "for an ulterior motive" of discreditable character. They are all instances of doing the right thing for the wrong reason. In my judgment, persons who do the wrong act for the right reason are ethically preferable to those who do the right act for the wrong reason, since a discreditable motive is more serious morally than a discreditable action. In the former case the discredit attaches to the person himself and to his character, and those who know about it will have cause to

fear him even when, like the Greeks, he brings gifts. It will be very much a matter of accident or caprice whether such a person does right acts at all, since there is a close causal affinity between a bad motive and a wrong act, closer indeed than between a good motive and a wrong act or between a bad motive and a right act. In a word, there is more moral hope for a person, or a community of persons, whose minds are set on goodness though they make mistakes in how to secure it, than in persons or a community of them whose main devotion is to evil though they sometimes act as if desiring to secure what is good.

The extra stringency of an obligation to make reparation is quite intelligible, in the sense that its reasonableness can be made out and not just intuited (though I do not say that intuition is necessarily irrational). It arises from the fact that I alone, as the original wrongdoer, may now make reparation. In regard to taking my nephew to the circus, I may decide that it is not necessary for me to promise to take him, since there are other relatives who can and almost certainly will do so; and this same thought may be a factor leading me to break the promise, if I have made it, and if circumstances then arise which justify me in wanting to break it. But with reparation, if I do not make it, it remains unmade for ever. This, I think, is a sufficient explanation of the extra obligatoriness in such a case.

The set of actions which for Ross are *prima facie* obligatory independently of the production of good, are also associated by him in so far as they arise out of special relations which we bear to other persons. There is indeed something special about the relevant personal relations, but not to such an extent as to separate them off from obligations arising from other human relations. I have gone some way already to a demonstration of this in showing that they all (for gratitude could have been treated similarly) get their rightness in respect of their expression or production of good. I have also suggested that moral goodness is directly a matter of

relations between persons and I now want to amplify this a little.

I agree with Hartmann that a moral situation is always personal, and bi-personal to boot, with the qualification (which Hartmann also inserts) that sometimes the one person appears twice over in the situation—indeed, I would say that this is not exceptional but is the basic type of the moral situation, just as Plato in the *Republic* is more concerned with the individual being just in himself than in his relations with his fellows. Moral action, therefore, is not just a doing of something to or with non-personal things, except as this doing is a means to some personal benefit or harm. And the supreme benefit or harm is that which arises in the persons concerned as agent and patient. In strict ethical consideration, we ought not to do non-moral good to anyone without some concern, sooner or later, as to the moral effects of our beneficence. When in recent years many nations of the world gave essential food and clothing to other nations in dire need, they and their members were immediately moved, no doubt, by this need and the simple necessity of relieving it; they imposed no moral means test on the recipients. Yet it was surely implicit in their action that it was of an emergency kind and not to go on for ever, not only because of the drain on their resources but also out of regard for the moral self-respect of the recipients. And these recipients would welcome aid only as a stopgap until they could once again provide themselves with food and clothing or buy these from elsewhere. Moral self-respect could prescribe no alternative. Moreover the most permanent good result from such international charity would be to generate charity in the deeper meaning of this term—that which we more commonly call goodwill. But this, of course, is a relation between persons on the spiritual level, and the goodness in question is the moral goodness of persons. No doubt what persons *are* to one another in their attitudes, and what they *do* to one another, are involved closely in mutual action and reaction, but the ethical primacy must always go to attitude

or spirit rather than to act, to the ought-to-be rather than to the ought-to-do. I believe that the conception of ought-to-be is not only ethically valid but is also morally fundamental, in such wise that ought-to-do is necessarily grounded on ought-to-be. But for the present I must leave this conviction in a dogmatic formulation, and perhaps return to its exposition and defence on some future occasion.

ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND FUNCTIONAL DESIGN

By S. A. GRAVE

THE most relevant part of Aristotelian philosophy to the theory of functional design is the concept of essence, elucidated by the doctrine of the four causes. The essence of anything is its primary being: *what* it absolutely or simply is, and could not be conceived as lacking and still be that special thing. As such the essence is the rationale of the thing's fundamental properties. Thus the traditional definition of man as a "rational animal" is meant as a definition of man's essence; a rational animal is what a man absolutely is, and must be in order to be a man. It is indifferent to his human nature whether he is black or white, but it is his human nature that he is a rational animal. Further, the properties or capacities of a man, as man, the capacities to laugh, cry, think, and so on, have their rationale in his essence, as so defined.

The essence is not only the absolute "whatness" or "quiddity" of an individual thing, but also the specific principle. Aristotle's doctrine of metaphysical species has been seriously misunderstood. Some make him a Platonist, others a nominalist. The Platonic view is that the "form" or essence exists outside the mind as a real abstract universal. The individuals of a class have their specific being when they "participate in" or "mirror" a form which is abstract and numerically one and single, as one and the same light is reflected by several mirrors. The Platonic form of man, for example, is man-in-general, the abstract universal "man", with none of the determinations of individual men. It is the great difficulty of this view that has led some commentators, in defiance of his whole epistemology, to turn Plato

into a nominalist. They turn his objective, extra-mental *idéa* into a subjective concept. And when you consider the form as the specific principle there is another difficulty. If, for example, this numerically single abstract man is the specific principle of humanity by individual participation, then there would be only one absolutely real human soul, of which the many individual souls are, as it were, shadows. But this is not Plato's doctrine of the soul.

Nominalism affects to deny the notion of quiddity, though when hard pushed it admits that there is what Locke, a half-nominalist, calls "the real internal . . . constitution of things".¹ It could hardly do otherwise, for some kind of quiddity is required by the law of identity. I take it that the essence of nominalism, in this respect, is that such an internal constitution is unknowable and that, even if it could be known, no deduction of *propria* from it would be possible, a thing being regarded as an aggregate of more or less independent properties. Nominalism also denies the reality of species. It holds that there is nothing objectively common to the members of a so-called specific class. We stick a class-label on them for the sake of convenience. This label is the universal concept, or in the case of extreme nominalism, the mere name. Aristotle's doctrine, as against nominalism, asserts a real objective identity in the members of a species; for example, x, y and z are called men, because there is in each a *qualitatively* identical nature. But against Plato he denied that a nature is numerically identical in members of a species. He held that essence is numerically multiplied by every individual of the species. Nor on his view does the essence ever exist abstractly as a universal, except in the intellect.

The Aristotelian theory of essence is elucidated by his account of the four causes—material, formal, efficient and final.²

Empiricist philosophers last century laughed heartily at the four causes, especially at the final cause. But the joke

¹ *Essay*, Bk. III, Ch. III, §15.

² *Physics*, 194b 23-35.

is that many of them who naively thought that efficient causation was the only sort of causation and made final causation meaningless, did not believe that there was any efficient causation.

In the case of substances, Aristotle usually identifies the essence with the formal cause or form,³ but sometimes he regards the essence of corporeal things as a compound of matter and form. "Of things defined, i.e., of 'whats', some are like 'snub' and some like 'concave'. And these differ because 'snub' is bound up with matter (for what is snub is a concave *nose*) while concavity is independent of perceptible matter. If then all material things are analogous to the snub in their nature . . . it is clear how we must seek and define the 'what' in the case of natural objects."⁴ In the case of events the essence may be the efficient cause; for example, thunder is the "quenching of fire".⁵

The relation of the formal and final causes is one of the most intricate problems in Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle's philosophy of nature is dominated by the analogy between nature and art. "Consider how the physician or how the builder sets about his work. He starts by forming for himself a definite picture . . . of his end and this he holds forward as the reason and explanation of each subsequent step he takes . . . Now in the works of Nature the good end and the final cause is still more dominant than in the works of art."⁶ This good end of the process of nature is the hierarchical realization of form—"the process of becoming attends upon being and is for the sake of being".⁷ The teleological explanation of the structure of organs and parts follows from the fact that the end of the operation of Nature is to actualise and perfect substantial form. In the case of organic parts the logical order of intelligibility is, function first, then form derivatively from function. The primary end of Nature is

³ *Metaphysics*, Z, 17.

⁴ *Metaphysics*, 1025b 30-1026a.

⁵ *Post. Anal.*, 94b 36.

⁶ *On the Parts of Animals*, 639b 16-22.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 778b 4.

the realisation of each specific form. At the same time Nature aims at an hierarchical organization of forms. A natural substance is not an isolated end in itself, but is ordered to higher beings.⁸ In natural substances, then, the realisation of the form is the end; that is, formal and final causes coincide. But the parts of things and the process of substantial generation are ordered to the actualization of form, and so in their case the final cause is logically prior to their formal structure. We may say that to realise substantial form Nature works like a craftsman in the fine arts. As the very existence of a painting or a poem is the artist's end, so the very existence of form is Nature's primary end, though in a secondary way a natural form has a functional significance, in so far as one thing is ordered to another.

But when a man produces an artefact, *function* is the intention and the form is derivative from that. Here is the distinction between the natural substance and the artificial product. In the natural substance, form is primary and *per se*. It is its own end. In the artefact, function or purpose is primary and *per se* and determines form. The form is not its own end. The essence of an artefact is thus the function it is intended for. "In the products of art, we make the material with a view to the function."⁹ This definition of the essence of an artefact is clearly pure functionalism, and that it is Aristotle's view is confirmed by the many casual functional definitions of houses, etc., scattered through his works. This analysis of the nature of an artefact, which we have worked out in accordance with Aristotelian principles, realises the characteristics of essence in general. Thus the primary being of the artefact lies in its purpose and in the form derivative from that. This purpose is the rationale of their parts and their coherent relation to one another and to the whole, and the same purpose is the principle of specific identity.

A little more could be said about this last point, because I think it solves a difficult problem in the realist theory of

⁸ *Politics*, 1256b 15-22.

⁹ *Physics*. 194b 7.

universals. The realist Aristotelian theory holds that what exists in the mind as an abstract universal has a real, but individual, existence in things. When considering natural beings, men, sparrows and gold, etc., only a sophisticated, not to say sophisticated, mind—at any rate a mind that went to school with Hume and Mill—doubts this. But “chair” and “table” are universals just as much as “man” and “sparrow” are, and the realist feels embarrassed at having to admit an objective “chairness” and “tableness” in chairs and tables. Yet what is good for one kind of universal should be good for another. And if the realist is slow to feel this uneasiness, let him read the discussion at the beginning of the tenth book of the *Republic*, on the “absolute essential bed” existing “in the nature of things”. To make matters worse, God is said to have made it. It reads like a burlesque of Platonic theory, and since Plato is quite willing to make fun of his own theories, we might think that this is what he is doing here. But it can hardly be that, because Plato needs to establish this proposition seriously, for his analysis of representational art as the shadow of a shadow depends upon it. So the realist is inclined to feel that tables and chairs are called such nominalistically, and he begins to wonder whether, after all, men and sparrows are not so called the same way. The difficulty seems to be got over by the Aristotelian analysis of the nature of artefacts. The nature of an artefact is primarily a function, which only reflects back a form, and determines the form only approximately. What is really present in all tables and chairs is a function. This is the real foundation of their universals, whereas the real foundation of the universal in a natural being is the form.

We may now begin to correlate these Aristotelian doctrines with some of the principles of modern functional design. We have worked out the Aristotelian doctrine of the essence of an artefact, that this consists in the thing's intended use and in a structure determined by this intended use. This metaphysical conclusion obviously coincides even in language with the fundamental principle of the functional theory of

design. This theory is opposed to the academic postulate, overpowering in the nineteenth century, and still, of course, very powerful—for people have been well conditioned by antique façades and “period” furniture—that useful objects such as houses, chairs, tables, etc., should have a “look” that has nothing to do with their use. A look, sanctified by tradition; so you get the ordinary criticism of modern utilitarian design. This is not, particularly, that the things it makes are ugly, still less that they do not work properly, but that they do not look as they should. Well, how should things look? That depends on what they are; that is, on their essence or nature. The Aristotelian analysis of the essence of an artefact shows it to be form derived from purpose. Functional design is thus natural design, and natural design is rational design, and rational design is beautiful design (“the appreciation of the beautiful is the appreciation of the rational”¹⁰)—objectively beautiful, even if we are slow to relearn a natural idiom.

There is also the “moderne”; the “round” and “square” houses, with slits or port-holes instead of windows, and appliqué decoration, and there is appropriate furniture for them. There is no mystery about their ugliness. They are irrational because they are anti-functional—parasites upon functional forms.

The precise function of a thing is not easy to discover except in a rough and ready way, and, of course, it is not the business of the philosopher to undertake the investigation of it; that is a matter for the practical art, not for the speculative science. Aristotle, like Plato, does however often refer to the rule, which is recognised as very important in functional planning, that the user prescribes to the producer.¹¹ In conformity with this rule, modern rational design is based on a minute investigation of the real and precise needs of the user, who is always an individual, living in a particular community, at a particular time and place; always different

¹⁰ Eric Gill, *Beauty Looks After Herself*, p. 58.

¹¹ *Physics*, 194b 1-10.

from other individuals, living in other communities at other times and places. So far as individual needs vary and so far as economy allows, the design varies responsively. The form of the product is determined by the satisfaction of these needs. Le Corbusier famously defined a house as "a machine to live in". Whatever else a house may be, and whatever wonderful thing the imagination of Le Corbusier made it, that is what the house primarily is. Human living is not just animal existence. To adapt Aristotle's words from another context: if the house as such exists for the sake of life, the good house exists for the sake of the good life. There follow the subtlety of the functions of the good house and the subtlety of structure which fulfils them in a harmonious unity.

The principle that use should determine structure is not, of course, something new in architecture and the other applied arts. It was always a primary principle, except in Victorian times, when making was first conceived not functionally but ornamentally; the ornament being doubly imitative, both of period styles and of craft work by the machine. The theory of radical and entire functionalism was, however, new as a reaction from irrationality, though in its extreme form it was more propaganda than a working procedure. Since then, use has regularly determined structure, where use has been relevant; thus it is not just this principle which makes modern buildings and furniture look different. The emphasis on use is more emphatic, but the difference is due chiefly to the discipline of new and contemporary uses. For example, the need for rigorous economy of space, inside and outside, for freedom of movement and for all the light and air that can be had, has resulted in the conception of the house-garden unit, and the multiple-purpose room, or indirectly in the "aetherialisation of architecture", one of the lovely things of our day where beauty rises exquisitely from function. A chair no longer for austere, magnificent or decorous posture, but precisely for bodily comfort, means a chair with a new look.

The most conspicuous correlation between Aristotelian philosophy and the theory of functional design is in this use-structure relationship which we have just illustrated. There is a further parallel in the structural significance of material in both.

The changed appearance of modern buildings and furniture is not only the response of new structural forms to new requirements. It is also due to the nature and possibilities of new materials. We can conveniently illustrate the significance of material for structural form by glancing at the revolution made possible by steel and reinforced concrete. These new materials are far stronger than any of the old materials, either natural or synthetic, and so buildings can be made with them far bigger and yet far lighter. This strength of material has allowed the shifting of support from the wall to the skeleton framework. The wall made free in this way can be reduced to a thin covering of glass, if transparency is wanted, but in any case to a mere shell. Thus the aetherialisation of architecture is not only the response to a need, but the consequence of a building material.

The history of architecture shows the continual and profound conditioning of structural form by material. To take only two well-known instances: (1) the distinctive Greek architecture of column and lintel was a natural result of the continuation of an archaic timber structure by a similar marble structure. But this continuation was only possible because marble was available in large blocks. (2) A different material factor influenced Gothic architecture. In the north of Europe big blocks of stone were scarce, and material necessity compelled an architecture of small stones. The medieval architects took over the solid Roman vault, thinned it out and by tireless experiment solved the engineering problem of the pointed arch, pieced together out of small stones. The span of these arches shifted the weight from the walls to piers supported by buttresses, and a frame structure arose, analogous to contemporary steel or concrete frame structures, with an analogous "dissolution" of the wall. The invention

of stained glass provided an appropriate and lovely medium for filling the screen walls. Here again material necessity operated, for the medieval craftsmen deferred to the condition of their material. They could only make glass in small bits and, leading them together, made a virtue of necessity.

These examples illustrate the correlation of the formal and the material cause. We might glance at the correlation of the final cause. No one says that a Greek temple or a Gothic cathedral looks as it does just because of a material necessity. It is not a rationalisation to say that the Gothic cathedral soared up to express human aspiration after another world, or that the Greeks used a monumental material deliberately, because of their aesthetic preoccupation with size. (This preoccupation was second nature to them. Aristotle reflects it in the *Poetics*. He says that size is the first consideration in beauty. Every beautiful thing must have a "certain determinate magnitude"—determined presumably by its species and by the consideration of its apprehension. It must not be too small and especially it must not be too big—"in a creature of vast size . . . instead of the object's being seen all at once, the unity and wholeness of it is lost".¹²)

It is a primitive mind which supposes that the material and final causes are mutually exclusive, just as it is a primitive mind which supposes the same about efficient and final causes. The cause of walking is for the sake of health (final) and from the will (efficient). The cause of the bowl is to hold water (final) and silver (material). The progress of philosophy from Thales to Aristotle is largely the recognition of one of the four causes after another, and its completion is the synthetic unity of causal explanation recognised by Aristotle. The "physicists" explained the world by the material cause—everything is water, or fire, or some similar substance. The Pythagoreans, and of course Plato, recognised the formal cause. Empedocles, Democritus and others isolated the efficient cause. Aristotle underlined the final cause, and formulated the ideal of complete scientific explanation in

¹² *Poetics*, 1450b 34-1451a 15.

terms of the four causes, the *cognitio certa per causas*. And because the causes which Aristotle detected and classified are objective realities in both natural and artificial "coming to be", they are significant in design. The relevance of three of them has already been indicated.

The significance of the other, the efficient cause, in general, that is, of the craftsman as craftsman, does not require comment. But there is one thing worth noting. In our day part of the efficient cause is the machine and its mechanically operating attendants. If surface pattern springs naturally from the creative spontaneity of the craftsman, how is the "eczematous eruption of pattern on the surface of modern manufactures"¹³ to be justified? Rigorists, like Eric Gill, demand a ruthless acceptance of this consequence of the change in the efficient cause. "Good building, that is to say architecture, in an industrial age is *plain* building. Plainness is a necessity. And plain means plain; it does not mean 'comparatively plain', or 'more or less plain'. It means completely devoid of all carvings and mouldings. It means completely devoid of all those things which in any way spring from the exuberance or inventiveness of the man on the job. The man on the job is devoid of exuberance and inventiveness; it is no use designing his exuberance for him in the office."¹⁴

It is worth while, for its intrinsic interest, to look more closely at Aristotle's conception of the material cause. In general he regards form as the determinant and matter as the determinable. The ultimate metaphysical contrast is between form, which is actuality, and primary matter, which is pure potentiality. Primary matter is distinguishable only in thought, for it cannot exist apart from its actualisation by some form; in this way it is a sort of "non-being". As pure potentiality, it is patient of any form. As itself ingenerable and incorruptible it is the ultimate substratum of all change. Corporeality (what we call "matter") is the product of primary matter and substantial form. There is, Aristotle

¹³ Roger Fry, *Vision and Design*, p. 63.

¹⁴ Gill, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

holds, a hierarchical organisation of this secondary or "informed" matter, the lower levels of this hierarchy being "matter" to the form of higher levels. Thus, in the case of an animal, the hierarchical material organisation would work out like this in terms of a primitive natural science. Primary matter with the "contrarieties" (primitive form) makes the "elements", which become "matter" relatively to a higher form, making "tissue"; this in turn becomes matter relatively to a still higher form, making "organs". Aristotle does not seem to settle the question whether, in the case of substantial change—that is, generation or corruption—the specific substantial form operates directly on primary matter to actualise it into the various grades, or whether it operates on secondary matter informed at various levels. If the latter, secondary matter would be not only determinable but a reciprocal determinant. But he does say that the definition must include reference to the matter proper to the species, because the "formable essence" can only exist in matter. Although he leaves it undecided whether the matter is in any way a *determinant* in natural substances, there is no doubt that the matter is a determinant in artefacts, for in them the form is accidental, not substantial. So, for example, Aristotle suggests the definition of the essence of a house in terms of a final cause (or functionally) "a shelter against destruction by wind, rain and heat", then in terms of the material cause "stones, bricks, and timbers"; and finally a synthetic definition of functional form in matter "that form in that material with that purpose or end".¹⁵ Thus Aristotle recognises abstractly what the history of architecture proves empirically—the reality of material determination.

We may lastly consider the relation of functional design to beauty. Plato made many exciting suggestions about the nature of beauty, toyed with them, and then tossed them aside. In the *Hippias Major*,¹⁶ Socrates, after deciding that beauty was not the same thing as a pretty girl, says unexpectedly

¹⁵ *On the Soul*, 403b 1-10.

¹⁶ 295c.

that it might be utility—"Let that which is useful be for us the beautiful". He argues that what we call a beautiful body is one which fulfils its function, and the same is true of "all utensils and vehicles". So beauty seems to be utility. Then Socrates attacks this identification. Utility implies capacity, and capacity can be for good or evil, so utility cannot be beauty, for beauty must be good. Nor can even useful capacity for good, or what he calls the "advantageous", be beauty, for then utility would be the cause of good, and he thinks the cause must be of a different nature from its effect, so once again utility would not be good, which the beautiful must be. The second argument, at least, is defective, for a cause need not be of a different nature from its effect; a univocal cause is of the same nature as its effect; for example, man begets man. The real objection to the equation of utility with beauty is that there are clearly many beautiful things which are only negligibly useful, things which, like metaphysics, are, as Aristotle says, "above servitude". But though the definition of beauty as utility was bound to break down, still Plato has recognised in this passage that, where utility is of the essence of a thing, perfect functionality is beautiful. He says this also in the *Republic*:¹⁷ "Are not the excellence, beauty and correctness of every manufactured article . . . to be tried only by reference to the purpose intended in their construction?"

It seems certain, however, that there can be two things which both perfectly fulfil their function and yet one may be more beautiful than the other. This additional beauty, then, cannot be the beauty of usefulness, but must reside in an intrinsically lovelier shape or colour. So the ideal of functional design, alone, is not a sufficient ideal for the maker but, at the same time, perfection for use is the foundation of the beauty of a thing made for use. Purpose must shine through form. This is the aesthetic ideal of the new architecture. "It is an aesthetic of the building, not something applied on it."¹⁸ Yet there is a curious puzzle about the beauty of utilitarian

¹⁷ 601.

¹⁸ Yorke and Penn, *A Key to Modern Architecture*.

objects. St. Thomas says often that "the good is the object of appetite"; but he says that "the beautiful is that which pleases when seen".¹⁹ This definition has something like consent in its favour. It is, for example, reminiscent of one of Plato's, and is not very different from Moore's: "the beautiful should be defined as that of which the admiring contemplation is good in itself".²⁰ And the element of *disinterested* contemplation has been very widely recognised as essential to the appreciation of beauty. The emphasis on utility seems to underline practical interest and so suggests that the useful thing, as existing to satisfy "appetite", could not properly be called beautiful. I suppose the difficulty is got over by the intention of approach. When we go to a thing to use it, we are aware of what Thomas calls its "goodness". When we admire it without this intention, but aware of its perfect utility, we experience its beauty.

One point remains: why should functional design be beautiful? A now widely accepted criterion of beauty is the presence of what is called "significant form". The question, "Significant of what?", is very hard to answer in regard to the fine arts, and the answers range from the artist's emotion to the order of the universe. But in the applied arts, the answer is obvious—"Significant of function". We might get further help from a consideration of the canons of beauty suggested by St. Thomas and Aristotle. Thomas says: Three things are needed for beauty, integrity (*integritas*), harmony (*consonantia*), radiance (*claritas*).²¹ Aristotle's canons are: order (*τάξις*), symmetry (*συμμετρία*), definiteness (*τὸ ὁρισμένον*). There is a certain coincidence of these canons. Aristotle's "order" and "symmetry" correspond pretty well to Thomas's *consonantia* and perhaps also to his *integritas*, since the word has also in its meaning the notion of completeness. The perfectly functional product has the *consonantia* of part with part, and part with whole in the structure reflected back from its intended use. It has the *integritas* of completeness and

¹⁹ *Summa Theologica*, I Q5 A4.

²⁰ *Principia Ethica*, p. 201.

²¹ *Summa Theologica*, I Q39 A8.

honesty. One makes a hesitating suggestion about *claritas* and "definiteness". In the fascinating discussion on aesthetics in James Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist*, Stephen says: "The radiance of which he (Thomas) speaks is the scholastic *quidditas*, the *whatness* of a thing".²² The idea is that sensible beauty consists in the manifestation of the essence through matter. We can compare this with Gill's view that aesthetic pleasure is "the delight of the mind in seeing the thing itself".²³ Aristotle may mean "quiddity" by this ambiguous phrase: τὸ ὀρισμένον. He says: "The chief forms of beauty are order, symmetry and definiteness . . . These (order and definiteness) are obviously the causes of many things."²⁴ The obvious way in which they are causal is as the formal cause or essence. Elsewhere²⁵ he uses the word ὅρος, from the same root, to mean the definition of essence. And Thomas, when he spoke of "radiance", may have remembered what his master, Albertus, said about beauty. He called it "the splendour of form shining on the proportioned parts of matter". If there is anything in this suggestion, the beauty of a thing perfectly made for use would consist in its functional essence, shining through its structure.

²² Ch. 5.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

²⁴ *Metaphysics*, 1078b 1.

²⁵ *Topics*, 103b 9.

REVIEWS

DANTE THE PHILOSOPHER. By Etienne Gilson. Translated by David Moore. (Sheed and Ward, 1948. xli + 338 pp.) Price (U.K.), 15s.

This is a book which some philosopher had to write sooner or later, for Dante's philosophy meets his poetry at so many points that any purely literary criticism is bound to be formal and superficial. On the other hand, it is an extremely delicate assignment; for a philosopher, unless he has also a proper literary sensibility, will always be in danger of assuming that a poet's philosophy is more important than his poetry. It is most fortunate that this necessary and exacting work has been undertaken by M. Gilson. He has all the qualifications: an immense erudition in mediaeval philosophy, admirable literary judgment, complete mastery of the Italian language, an unerring sense of proportion, wit, urbanity, and stout common sense. In this his latest work they all function at the top of their form, and the result is a book than which it is hard to imagine a better. The pitfalls are recognised from the start and most skilfully avoided. On the question which is so crucial in Dante scholarship, that of determining what is allegory and what is not, he displays great good sense, and he disposes of the extreme allegorists like Father Mandonnet with a subtle and polished ridicule which should serve as a model for scholarly controversy; invariably clinching his point by crucial quotations from Dante himself. In particular, he emerges as the champion of the real Beatrice—the authentic actual Beatrice, daughter of the good burgher Folco Portinari, and later a blessed soul in Paradise—against the varied allegorical attenuations of her with which the learned critics have so bewildered the honest reader. He never forgets that Dante is first a poet and secondly a politician, and in both capacities swayed by his loves and hates: a powerful intellect, one of the most powerful of his time; but not an intellectual.

The position Dante assigned to philosophy is related with great care and precision in the *Convivio*—the only work of his which deals primarily with philosophical problems. After the death of Beatrice in 1290, apart from the moral crisis which forms the subject of a terrible rebuke from Beatrice (*Purgatorio* XXX) and ended only with his marriage to Gemma Donati in 1295, he appears to have experienced an intellectual crisis in the shape of a first encounter with secular philosophy. Being a poet in the tradition of chivalry, Dante represented this new interest as a "noble lady", "*donna gentile*", and tells us that she took "a certain place in his mind". Though with difficulty,

because Beatrice "still held the citadel of his mind", the new love prevailed for a time, until the vision related in *Vita Nuova* XXXIX restored him finally to Beatrice. In unpoetic terms, in his absorption in philosophy Dante almost forgot his personal loyalties and even his vision of eternal life—which was not unlikely in one who never did anything by halves; but in the end acknowledged the greater loyalty and never swerved again. It could not be made clearer that, except for a short period of enthusiasm, philosophy never ruled his mind. "Dante the philosopher" plays only a minor part in his intense personal drama.

None the less, the *Convivio* shows us that the short period of allegiance to the *donna gentile* left a permanent mark upon his mind. M. Gilson proves by convincing quotation that, while he ended by placing revealed religion high above philosophy, he never subordinated philosophy to its jurisdiction. Herein is displayed a permanent tendency of Dante's mind, "to base the autonomy of an inferior order on its very inferiority" (p. 140). Dante does not, like Siger of Brabant and the so-called "Averroists" at Padua, affirm that what is false in philosophy may be true in theology; on the contrary, he underlines their congruity; but he bases it on the complete independence of philosophy. In the same way, in the *De Monarchia*, he underlines the congruity of Papacy and Empire, but he bases it on the complete independence of the Empire. As M. Gilson remarks (p. 98n.), "A thinker who, up to the end of his life, has regarded moral philosophy and politics as autonomous and separate orders, to the point of exempting them from the jurisdiction of theology and the Church, may perfectly well have passed through a crisis of pure philosophism of which this remnant of separatism is the sign."

There are in the *Convivio* two main illustrations of this formula. The first is the quite remarkable arrangement of theology, metaphysics, and ethics. Dante never doubts the absolute supremacy of theology, but he sets it on one side, transcendent and unutterable, too far removed from human invention either to be supported by philosophy or to clash with it. (One recalls the status of the Emperor in Japan before 1867.) Agreement is achieved by a distinction of planes and not by adaptation. Already there is some divergence from the Thomist formula. But further, within the field of philosophy, Dante quite deliberately assigns the primacy to ethics. This is his own innovation, and it is not wholly accounted for by the purpose of the *Convivio*, which was to convey his philosophical excitement to laymen in the vulgar tongue. It arises from a fundamental sense of the limitations of human reason. Contemplation is a divine activity, and human participation in it is fitful and precarious. Doubtless it is superior to action *in itself*, as Aristotle has observed,

Eth. ad Nic. X, and as we are instructed in Scripture by the story of Martha and Mary. But to rise above ethics is to rise above man, and therefore, *for us*, ethics has the primacy: it can come to fruition in this world, as metaphysics (a purely contemplative activity, concerned with what is eternally) cannot. There are, in fact, three forms of beatitude, *eὐδαιμονία*: the beatitude of action, the beatitude of contemplation, and the supernatural beatitude which is the reward of faith. Of these, only the first is within our compass here and now.

It is M. Gilson's contention, and there is much to be said for it, that Dante's conclusion is the result of meditating on Aristotle's *Ethics*. It was undoubtedly Dante's habit to look for the appropriate master in each field and to accept him; and Aristotle was his master in philosophy:

Vidi il maestro di color che sanno

Seder tra filosofica famiglia.

Now Aristotle in the *Ethics* gave us both a picture of "beatitude" attainable by the proper direction of all virtues to the political end, and a picture of contemplation as an end in itself, in which man becomes like to God so far as he may. This unresolved duality of loyalties, on which commentators on Aristotle have often remarked, and which, in Aristotle, is spontaneous and undeliberate, is taken by Dante as a purposeful dichotomy, and used to distinguish the sphere of politics from the sphere of philosophy. This derivation is in fact quite plausible. It compels us to suppose that Dante set up Aristotle as a master after reading the *Ethics* alone; but that, in a man with Dante's gift of instantaneity, would not be surprising.

It has, moreover, the great advantage of offering a simple explanation of the other main problem of the *Convivio*: the separation of philosophy and politics. In philosophy the authority is Aristotle, in politics the Emperor. The authority of Aristotle does not run in the conduct of affairs; but the authority of the Emperor does not run in philosophy. "I say unto you, King Charles and King Frederick, and unto you other tyrants and princes, that it were better for you to fly low like the swallows" (*Convivio* IV. 6). Here is the beginning of a distinction between the spheres of thought and action which has, in fact, had much to do with the development of a theory of toleration; and it shows how a belief in divided authority, however strict each authority may be in its own sphere, is favourable to the cause of variety and freedom.

The principle that inferiority does not involve subordination is at the root of the absolute distinction between Papacy and Empire in the *De Monarchia*. Much, no doubt, of Dante's inspiration was political and even partisan. It was a crucial moment for him when, in 1300, on the proposal that a hundred soldiers should be sent to

Pope Boniface VIII, he moved in the Grand Council that no action be taken; and the long exile resulting from it not only transformed him from a political leader into a great poet, but also made him especially accessible to doctrines hostile to Papal interference. These doctrines, however, he had already adopted before he became politically important; it is one of those cases in which thought and circumstance aid and abet each other, and it is fruitless to ask which came first. Dante never doubted that the sphere ruled by the Pope was a higher sphere than that ruled by the Emperor; but, according to his usual formula, that gave the Pope no right to interfere in secular affairs. The spiritual influence of the Pope extends to the Emperor as a human being (*De Mon.* III. 16: a passage which has been mistaken for a retraction), and, for Dante, who had a boundless respect for a properly spiritual Pope, this is no small matter. But the intervention of the Pope in the Emperor's orbit was an offence against his principle of appropriate authority. Each is dependent on God alone, who is the Author both of the natural world and of the supernatural society of the Church. Let the Church, then, devote itself to the preparation of souls for the world to come, and let the Empire practise the art of governing. Let the Emperor guide the human race to happiness in accordance with philosophy, and let the Pope guide the human race to eternal life in accordance with Revelation.¹

Now Dante can enforce this independence of the Emperor in regard to the Pope only if, as there is one Pope, there is also one Emperor. At a time when the claims of the Empire were in abeyance, and the increasing importance of France, England, the Spanish kingdoms and the Italian city-states was making them unreal, Dante was bold enough, and visionary enough, to insist on a single secular sovereignty. It is just this visionary quality which makes a man's writings come alive seven hundred years after he is dead, while the more sensible *pièces de circonstance* pass into oblivion: certainly nothing could be more relevant today than the opening chapters of the *De Monarchia*, which provide the thesis (democracy being the antithesis) for the synthesis of a modern world order. The arguments he brings forward (e.g., the goal of contemplation cannot be secured without peace, and without a single sovereign there can be no peace; the only ruler who is free from "cupiditas", greed, the *πλεονεξία* of Aristotle, *Ethics V*, is the ruler who has no one left to envy) are not

¹ On p. 183 M. Gilson very pertinently contrasts Dante, *De Monarchia*, III, 3: "We owe to the Supreme Pontiff what is the due, not of Christ, but of Peter", with St. Thomas, *De Regimine Principum*, I, 14: "The Roman Pontiff, to whom all the kings of the Christian people owe submission, as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself."

without their modern analogues.² But the position as a whole rests on the methodological presupposition already disclosed in the *Convivio*, which it is M. Gilson's great merit to have made explicit: that to be higher in the scale of values does not entitle an activity to interfere with the conduct of that which is lower. For a single graded hierarchy Dante substitutes a series of parallel but unequal authorities each owing allegiance only to God.

When we come to the *Divine Comedy*, we have to remember (and M. Gilson helps us by continual reminders) that it is primarily a poem, and that such philosophical sidelights as it contains are only incidental. It does, it is true, rest on a certain cosmological framework and on certain philosophical convictions; it is utterly dependent, for example, both on a belief in eternal life and on a sense of God and His justice. But much of this could be accepted on faith; and such points of philosophy as arise do not distinguish Dante from any other mediaeval thinker. There is no need to suppose that the *selva oscura*, the dark wood in which Dante found himself lost in mid-career, was philosophy, or anything like it; it was far more probably the life of debauchery not mentioned in either the *Vita Nuova* or the *Convivio*, but attested to by the scurrilous sonnets exchanged between Dante and his former boon companion, Forese Donati: that same reprobate who, in the *Purgatorio*, has the effrontery to discourse on the impudicity of the women of Florence. Nor is there need to stress the presence in Limbo of the philosopher esteemed by Dante above all others, namely Aristotle; his location is merely the formal consequence of his unbaptised condition and not a slur on his philosophy; and, after all, Limbo is comparatively salubrious. There is in fact no reflexion on the status of philosophy in the *Divine Comedy*; there is the pilgrimage of a soul awakened from sensuality by poetry and sustained by the blessed spirit of a woman whom he had loved.

There is, however, in the *Divine Comedy* confirmation of Dante's characteristic doctrines. It occurs in the speeches of St. Bonaventura and St. Thomas in Canti IX-XII of the *Paradiso*, and centres round the appearance in Paradise of Siger of Brabant. To this surprising and scandalous apparition is devoted almost the whole of M. Gilson's chapter on "Philosophy in the *Divine Comedy*".

The main purpose of the speeches is comparatively plain. St. Bonaventura eulogises the Dominican order, and St. Thomas the Franciscan. The point of the juxtaposition is that each praises the other for being what both ought to be. What is praised in the Franciscans is love; what is praised in the Dominicans is faith. What is deprecated in the Franciscans is their departure from poverty.

² Bertrand Russell has recently made an appeal to the United States to assume a similar role, on exactly similar grounds.

What is deprecated in the Dominicans is their absorption in worldly affairs, and especially in the law, from which they concocted arguments for the Pope's temporal supremacy. Dante, in fact, is pleading in his customary vein for spiritual purity, this time in the Mendicant Orders. What is not so plain is why the speakers are compelled, as it were, to have on their platforms extremists of their own order with whom, as a known matter of history, they were out of sympathy. St. Bonaventure regarded Joachim of Flora as a fanatical ignoramus and approved of his condemnation: yet in the *Divine Comedy* he stands sponsor to him and praises him ("di spirito profetico dotato", *Paradiso* XII, 1.141). In the same way, St. Thomas introduces and approves Siger of Brabant.

For those who regard Dante as an orthodox Thomist the problem is a hard one. Siger was the chief of the so-called "Latin Averroists" whose doctrines had been condemned by Tempier, the Archbishop of Paris, in 1277. This was a *cause célèbre*, and there is no possibility that Dante, who was well informed on the theological history of the thirteenth century, should have been unaware of it. The doctrines for which Siger was condemned included the "unity of the active intellect" and the view that what was true in philosophy might be false in theology: and to both of these doctrines St. Thomas was resolutely opposed. But the fact remains that Dante, knowing the whole story, still approved sufficiently of Siger to put him in Paradise. This is enough to make us examine his alleged Thomism more closely.

A simple solution of the problem would be that Dante was himself a "Latin Averroist"; and both Renan (*Averroés et l'Averroïsme*, p. 272) and Reinach (*L'énigme de Siger*, *Revue historique*, 1926) maintained that Dante had actually been Siger's pupil. In the strict sense, Dante was not an Averroist; he denied that the independence of philosophy entailed the possibility of a clash with theology. But he did uphold the independence of philosophy; and there is little doubt that that is why Siger figures in Paradise. He is there despite (dare one say, going further than M. Gilson, because of?) his condemnation. "*Sillogizzò invidiosi veri*", says Dante (and puts the phrase into St. Thomas's own mouth): he uttered "truths" which made him unpopular. What Dante approved in Siger clearly outweighed his disagreements. Siger was the type of the pure philosopher who did not meddle in theology and did not want theologians to meddle with him. He stood, in his own sphere, for the integrity of the temporal power. Dante's attitude in the matter is audacious, but characteristic. The poet who kept a reserved seat for a reigning Pope in Hell would have no scruple about admitting an unpretentious and unwilling heretic to Heaven.

There remains, however, the role assigned to St. Thomas. In this connexion it should be remembered that the condemnation of 1277 only just stopped short of the Thomists, and some of its promoters thought it should have included them. M. Gilson properly reminds us that St. Thomas would not have approved the use made by Siger of his philosophical independence; and we may add that his followers were considerably embarrassed by it, much as a modern Labour leader is embarrassed by Communist glosses on his party's programme. But the fact remains that St. Thomas *did* believe in the independence of philosophy; he believed that if it used its independence properly it would return to its theological home; but he was quite convinced that there was a field to be explored by the light of reason alone, and in one notable case, that of creation in time, he held that philosophy could not demonstrate what theology declared to be true. Of this side of Thomism Dante entirely approved; and it is one of the very few possible criticisms of M. Gilson's discussion that he under-stresses it. At any rate, for Dante, what was important about St. Thomas was the point on which Siger agreed with him. This was Dante's warrant for putting into the mouth of St. Thomas, as a poetic character, an encomium which, because of differences on other issues about which Dante was less concerned than he was, the historical St. Thomas would have avoided. For the rest, M. Gilson is certainly right, and shows his usual literary discernment, when he insists that Dante's historical characters, in their poetic setting, are stripped of all their incidental qualities and become living embodiments of the purposes for which Dante has seen fit to introduce them (p. 268).

The installation in Paradise of Siger of Brabant completes and clinches the doctrine of the *Convivio*, and provides an intellectual analogue for the independence of the secular power. It is at once the dramatic culmination of a theory and an indirect satisfaction of his ruling political passion. Everything in Dante centres round his theory of appropriate authorities. On their just and proportionate adaptation under God hangs the harmony of the human race. In other times (e.g., in the days of Henry VIII and Sir Thomas More) the encroachment has come from the side of the State. In the days of Boniface VIII and his bombastic *Unam Sanctam* it came unquestionably from the Pope. For Dante, as for the early Greek philosophers, "encroachment" was the major evil. For him, as for them, everything has its bounds. It is not for nothing that in the *De Monarchia* "greed" is set down as the great political evil, and that the image of the "she-wolf" should loom so large in the *Inferno*. What "outsteps its measures" destroys the balance which the Creator has established. The remedy is thoroughly mediaeval; it is obedience, not accom-

modation; but obedience to the appropriate authority. Loyalty was Dante's great virtue; the traitors (not the infidels) are placed in the lowest depth of Hell—Judas Iscariot, who betrayed God, and Brutus and Cassius, who betrayed Caesar. The supreme need is to find the right authority and to be loyal to it; and though all authority is of God, the channels of its descent are various and each in its own sphere is final. This is the unfaltering discipline laid upon himself by a man who was by nature, and who knew himself to be, proud, passionate and insubordinate. Fortunately, the poetic form reveals to us, from behind the tense and charged tranquility, flashes of the imprisoned lightning.

This review is restricted to an exposition of M. Gilson's theme, because it is so convincing and so well sustained that criticism is almost silenced. I say "almost"; for there is one noticeable omission. In devoting himself to philosophical and literary issues M. Gilson early forgets about contemporary history. Thus, in his discussion of the relation of St. Thomas and Siger of Brabant, he discusses Dante's early fourteenth century comment as if it had been intended to apply to the conditions of 1277. At the time of Siger's condemnation, the Thomists were principally concerned to oppose the "philosophism" of the "Latin Averroists". But when Dante wrote, the extravagances of Boniface VIII appeared to call in question such independence as St. Thomas had himself allowed to the secular world. At that time and in relation to the new issues, it would be not at all unreasonable to plant St. Thomas and Siger side by side; the moderate and the extremist on one side being joined together against extremism on the other. Those who were divided on the issues of 1277 might well have been united on the issues of, say, 1308, the year of *Unam Sanctam*. For Siger, grace is one thing and nature another; for St. Thomas, grace perfects nature; for Boniface VIII grace, as dispensed by himself, swallows nature. With whom the Thomist should stand (so Dante could argue) must depend on the issue which has been raised. Now Boniface VIII claimed plenary authority over the secular power; and for Dante (and for St. Thomas, and for M. Gilson) that entails claiming the total subjection of philosophy to revelation. But that is a view to which St. Thomas as well as Siger would have been opposed. Hence, on the issue which Dante really cared about, the issue of 1308, they could be represented as brothers in the truth.

In conclusion, a word about the translation. As one who has protested more than once in this Journal about the low level of translations from the French, I take great pleasure in recording that this translation is truly excellent: terse, vigorous, accurate, and a delight to read. It adds to the intense admiration provoked by the work itself.

A. BOYCE GIBSON.

FREUD AND CHRISTIANITY. By R. S. Lee, M.A., B.Litt., D.Phil. (James Clarke and Co. Ltd., 1948.) Price (U.K.), 8s. 6d.

The author of this modest but interesting book, by birth and training an Australian, is now rector of St. Mary's, the University Church, at Oxford. He is also a convinced Freudian. The combination is not as common as it should be, and suggests to those unaccustomed to it a paradoxical mind with a bent for fireworks. Actually his book, while thoughtful and in places quite original, is sensible and limited and not at all startling. It does not attempt to estimate the truth either of Christian teaching or of psycho-analysis; it takes them both for granted. It has very little to say about Freud's philosophical presuppositions, and ignores (not as being unimportant, but as not being relevant to its special purpose) the apparent conflict between them on the one hand and any possible Christian philosophy on the other. It assumes, without discussion, that Freud's method of analysis is logically separable from his philosophy; a view with which the reviewer is in agreement, but which, he feels, requires to be argued in detail. The reason for these apparently serious omissions is that the writer limits himself scrupulously to his objective, which is to expound Freud's developmental psychology to the Christian layman, and to show what Christians can learn from it about their own faith and practice.

Within these limits, which are self-imposed and in no way due to carelessness, the work is helpful and illuminating. The exposition, though containing little reflective comment (again that deliberate austerity), is clear and to the point, and can be commended as introductory reading for the general public. It also quietly prepares the way for the more important latter section of the work, in which the discoveries of psycho-analysts are brought to bear on Christianity. "Conscious and unconscious are integral parts of the whole man" (p. 16): the religion which is founded on repression is therefore not the religion of the whole man, as revealed and commended in the life and teaching of Jesus Christ.

It is in Part II that the fun begins. "The unconscious is the infantile mind retaining the wishes, fantasies, and judgments of the infantile mind" (p. 84)—"derived from the repressed sex and aggressive instincts in their various stages of development" (p. 85). These survivals of the infantile in adult life are certain to appear in adult religion. The unconscious, the dissociated irresponsible *Id*, working according to the pleasure-pain principle and oblivious of the reality-principle, and surviving at the base of later character-formations, renders the adult Ego (which, by hypothesis, is unaware of it) incapable of distinguishing clearly between fact and fantasy. Hence a persistent corresponding tendency to "wishful thinking" in

religion; the lure of supernatural compensation, the desire to be comforted in adversity instead of meeting it, and other deformations of the faith which leave us wondering "whether it is really Christianity". But—and we must note it in general terms at the outset—they *are* deformations, and not the good news which Christ brought to men.

The various deformations of religion are then set out, each corresponding to a particular fixation in the process of growth to maturity. Dr. Lee accepts the full doctrine of "the trauma of birth", and with it the concept of the "death instinct", which looks back to a primal perfection ("the return to the womb"), and is still embodied in the apparently forward-looking mythology of eternal quiescence in Heaven. "Paradoxical as it may seem it is about Heaven . . . that the death instinct has freest rein" (p. 105). He suggests to his fellow-Christians that a more active Heaven would be fitter for the full man, and reminds them that when Adam and Eve left the Garden of Eden an angel with a flaming sword stood at the entry *to see that they did not go back*—the reality-principle victoriously in action.

The other deformations are equally influential on Christianity and equally un-Christian. (i) The halting of love at the narcissistic stage, which incapacitates us for the Christian *Agape* but gives rise to an elevated religiosity and a self-centred delight in exalted feelings. (ii) Mother-fixation ("getting stuck on the bridge to the world"), which makes the worshipper run to the Church for protection, not using his hurts as stepping-stones to victory, but merely enduring them and therefore wanting to be comforted. (iii) Too drastic a self-identification with the father as a solution of the Oedipus situation, which creates a cleft between Ego and Super-Ego, and thus intensifies the sense of guilt beyond the requirements of a normal growth to maturity. The result is a high-minded negative religion of duty, and, paradoxically but inevitably, the reinstatement of the Pharisee as the typical Christian.

As Freud has stated that the Super-Ego is the seat of religion, this last point is of special importance, and Dr. Lee elaborates it in his chapters on *Conscience and Moral Obligation*, and on *The Super-Ego, Sin and Atonement*. He follows Freud in treating conscience as an instrument of the Super-Ego. Now the Super-Ego is a good servant but a bad master. It helps to deal with the Id, but the more insistent it is, the more it bears witness to the strength of the repressed Id with which it has to deal. A *very* strong conscience is thus the sign of an imperfectly resolved Oedipus complex, and "not at all a sure sign of moral goodness" (p. 150). "It is not the Super-Ego but the Ego which relies on its sense of reality and its power in

reasoning, which should play the chief part in determining what is good" (p. 153). He follows the same course in his treatment of guilt. The sense of guilt arises from the condemnation of the Ego by the Super-Ego, and is quite inevitable, for without the Super-Ego the Oedipus conflict could not be resolved. None the less, the Ego cannot live fruitfully in such a condition, and the Christian religion appraises the situation realistically when it announces liberation from guilt through the Universal Saviour. But it has often been (a) too much concerned with guilt ("Jesus was not primarily interested in Sin", p. 173); and so (b) has estimated the degree of guilt by the standards of the infantile Ego with a towering Super-Ego standing over it, and (c) has demanded the total quiescence of the Ego as the price for its redemption. It has failed to see how God co-operates with man, and how man co-operates with God. This tendency is not in accordance with the classical dictum of Thomas Aquinas, "*Naturam non tollit gratia sed perficit*", "Grace does not abolish nature but completes it", and it is not in accordance with the handling of men by Jesus Himself. It is not the Christian religion but a corruption of the Christian religion. Of that corruption, but of that corruption alone, Freud's accusations are true.

To all such interpretations Dr. Lee opposes what he calls Ego-religion, which "springs not from the strictures of the Super-Ego but from the Ego's grasp of the nature of the real world" (p. 174). "The truly Christian way—that which was shown in Christ and taught by Him—lies neither in the surrender to the Super-Ego nor in its renunciation, but in a harmonious co-operation or synthesis from which Id, Ego, and Super-Ego all grow in strength, because inner conflict is reduced to a minimum" (p. 176). What this way requires of us is a discipleship in which identification is blended with reflective judgment, so that the condemnation we pass on ourselves neither runs to seed in a paralysing sense of unworthiness, nor is removed by an external agency without any call on our own effort or intelligence, but transcends itself and issues in a positive transformation. If we grow naturally in grace, the Super-Ego attracting us but not forcing us, we may do in our small way what Jesus did supremely: develop a simple and unpretentious attitude of worship to a God who is nearer to us than breathing. Anyhow, the occurrence of "Ego-religion" in the Christian tradition shows that the Super-Ego religion with which alone Freud seems to have been acquainted is not the only type of religion, and that anti-religious arguments which presume that it is may in fact be true and yet not touch the heart of the matter. As Dostoevsky's Myshkin observed: "The atheist is always talking about something else".

To conclude: If there is a religion of the whole man (and there is: it is presented four-square in the Gospels), and if the effect of

psycho-analysis as a form of therapy is to make us whole (and this is as certain as that it diagnoses us as divided), then psycho-analysis will be one way of producing the state of affairs in which a genuinely Christian religion is possible. Psycho-therapy is one of the oldest and most distinguishing characteristics of Christianity, and the discovery of an important new technique may serve to remind the churches of a somewhat suspended vocation. The new technique will, it is true, have to attack the structures on which the various religions of dissociation have been founded; but at least for the Christian religion this will be a gain and not a loss.

There are many other points covered by Dr. Lee's review; he discusses, for example, the value of the Church's ministry to neurotics, and concludes, very sensibly, that they are somewhat less neurotic for being religious. (He could, in this connexion, have asked whether secularists are not also neurotic, and also what repressions underlie the fanatical hostility to religion which they sometimes exhibit—but it is not his way to be provocative.) There are also problems, especially philosophical problems, which he does not cover. He does, however, provide an admirable starting-point from which to raise them; and in any case he accomplishes admirably what he sets out to accomplish. It is good to read on the cover that he has carried off a jealously guarded honour, and has on the strength of this book been awarded the D.Phil. of the University of Oxford.

A. BOYCE GIBSON.

MAN FOR HIMSELF. By Erich Fromm. (Kegan Paul, 1949. xiv + 254 pp.) Price (U.K.), 12s. 6d.

Erich Fromm rejects "authoritarian" ethics and claims to be following Aristotle and Spinoza (among others) in the attempt to develop a "humanistic" ethics. While this is non-authoritarian, it is absolute in the sense that it is objective: Fromm is strongly opposed both to the view that abandons all moral principles, which, he thinks, enthrones expediency in their place, and to the "relativism" that says that what any society demands is right for it. Through the influence of this relativism, he thinks, Freudian theory and practice are tending to regard adjustment as the criterion of health. Against this, he develops the notion of the "socially patterned defect": a certain defect may become "normal" in a society, and the person who has this defect, though not neurotic, is still far from healthy; in fact one cause of neurosis may be the very strength of productive (healthy) tendencies that struggle against this social patterning.

Freudian theory, however, is not wholly relativistic, and in its distinction between the mature or genital character (which is independent and productive) and the pre-genital characters (which are

dependent, greedy, or stingy) Fromm finds the basis for his humanistic ethics. His theory has a considerable resemblance to that sketched by Professor Anderson in a number of articles in this Journal: spontaneity, for example, characterises the good activities, of which artistic creation is one, while compulsiveness characterises the non-productive orientations. Fromm gives brief but acute descriptions of the "receptive", the "exploitative", and the "hoarding" orientations, and a much fuller and extremely interesting account of the "marketing orientation", which he takes to be particularly characteristic of contemporary society. This marketing orientation involves an abandonment of one's identity and peculiar interests: one treats oneself as a commodity, and one's value depends on the anonymous market demand for one's powers: equality has come to mean indifference or interchangeability: thinking also is determined by the marketing orientation, and one seeks not truth but the ability to manipulate things: most intelligence tests are attuned to this kind of thinking, and would be better called "mental adjustment tests".

Similarly, Fromm distinguishes productive love from both dependence and possessiveness, and productive thinking from both subjectivity (seeing a thing as one wants it to be) and detachment (absence of interest). The productive attitude in both these fields involves respect for the object and also the relating of oneself to the object, that is (as we may put it) it recognises the independence of both terms of the relation. In distinguishing reason from intelligence Fromm argues that intelligence does not question the goal or the premises; it is the tool for attaining practical goals and is concerned with the knowledge necessary for manipulating things, whereas reason is concerned with the essence of things in the sense of what is generic, universal, and pervasive. Here, however, he seems to fall into error in assigning to reason the knowledge of goals, and in distinguishing "rational" from "irrational" goals—an error connected with his failure to criticise the normative character of ethics.

One point that Fromm makes very clearly is that there are superficial oppositions between different non-productive orientations: thus masochism contrasts with sadism, compulsive activity with laziness, and yet in each case we really have a pair of complementary symptoms, both of which are fundamentally opposed to productiveness. (Compulsive activity, by the way, is an example of a socially patterned defect which commonly characterises the adjusted person of the present period.)

In dealing with the problem of determinism and "moral judgments" Fromm points out that we can predicate an ethical quality (in a non-authoritarian sense) of a character without pre-supposing freewill. What the determinist cannot do is to "judge", in the manner

of God or a judge set in authority. This point, correct in itself, is not, however, in harmony with Fromm's retention of the normative character of ethics, for if the good life is the function of man, the good activity is what is to be done, and to predicate such normative terms is to make a demand, it has not "the same logical character as a rational judgment in general".

In fact, what is lacking in Fromm's work is a logical criticism of normative or, more generally, of relativistic ethics (in Professor Anderson's sense). While he makes the qualitative distinction between productive and non-productive, he still speaks of things being good *for* someone. The "formal criterion" of authoritarian ethics is that it denies man's capacity to know what is good or bad: the clearest example of it is that variety of theological ethics according to which we know good only as what God commands, we could not independently know its goodness. But then any system of "norms" which can be directly known (by reason or moral sense, for example) is not "formally" authoritarian, though "materially" it may be, if it works in the interest of some authority and is not concerned wholly with "man's welfare". That is, Fromm does not criticise the notion of a "norm" as an independently existing entity, he does not realise that a norm, being in part a demand, must be the demand of something or somebody, and not just part of the nature of things.

In consequence, he treats humanistic ethics as recommending a certain way of life, and he therefore hedges on the question of freewill: "productiveness is an attitude which every human being is capable of, unless he is mentally and emotionally crippled"—where the first part of the sentence is required for the sake of objective ethical recommendation, while the second part, in the interests of psychological determinism, practically contradicts the first part, making the whole either trite or meaningless.

Again, part of what Fromm finds to agree with in Aristotle and Spinoza is the doctrine of a function of man. He has to admit that man is potentially bad as well as potentially good, but insists that the latter is a "primary potentiality", that the good development occurs in "normal" conditions, i.e., conditions that are in accordance with "existential needs". It is easy to see that either this is tautologous—goodness itself being what makes one potentiality primary, and the relation to goodness what constitutes normal conditions and existential needs—or else it is false—for example, if normal means what commonly happens or if existential needs are simply the demands that occur. In other words, because Fromm retains the notion of a normative ethics he tries to bolster up qualitative ethical distinctions with a false functional theory.

Similarly, Fromm has a very questionable theory of the basic human problem, one aspect of which is that man is alone in the world and yet cannot bear to be alone; he regards productiveness as a solution—the only real solution—of this problem. He tries to show that productiveness brings satisfaction, while the non-productive orientations leave one really (even if unconsciously) dissatisfied. And so, although he argues that hedonism is only a first attempt at humanistic ethics, he is drawn back to it by his confusion of ethical description with recommendation.

Fromm's individualism (reflected in the title of the book) is perhaps connected with this normative view. Treating productiveness as a self-subsistent norm, he ignores the fact that it is socially sustained and transmitted. Consequently, while he distinguishes "a constructive fight against the (evil) impulse" from suppression and repression, he cannot give any plausible account of how this goes on. And similarly, while he gives a very good account of the authoritarian conscience as "the voice of an internalised external authority", and also of the way in which it can be produced by even a "progressive" education, the contrasting account of the humanistic conscience as "man's recall to himself" is less satisfactory. He treats it as "the reaction of our total personality to its proper functioning or dysfunctioning" or "the voice of our true selves", but surely this "total" personality is not really total, since the motives involved in the dysfunctioning are not part of it, nor can one self be truer than another. This "totality" or "true self", is, like the primacy of the potentiality for good, an imaginary entity introduced in order to support the recommendation of goodness. If the humanistic conscience were treated as the internalised productive movement, a more realistic account could be given of its operation, and at the same time it need not be reduced to a mere species of authoritarian conscience, since the way in which a productive movement calls upon the individual is different from the way in which an authority (internal or external) makes commands of a compulsive sort.

In this respect Fromm would be one of the many theorists who having failed to recognise social movements have to assert independently existing "norms" to take their place.

This book, then, is valuable in two ways: first, for its working out of the qualitative distinction between productive and non-productive orientations, and secondly, when the author attempts to develop the "ethical" side of his theory, for its illustration of the confusions that are reintroduced by individualism and the normative approach.

JOHN MACKIE.

SOCIAL PRAGMATISM. By Lan Freed. (C. A. Watts, 1948. 264 pp.)
Price (U.K.), 15s.

This book falls into two parts: in the first the author criticises and rejects "moralism", by which she means most of traditional ethical theory, and in the second she states her own doctrine of "social pragmatism". What she rejects in the traditional theory is the prescriptive character, the notion of the absolute "ought", the categorical imperative, and—since she takes this to be linked with such transcendental notions—the notion of the intrinsically good. She criticises these on the ground that the ethical theories based on them are inevitably incoherent, and she points for example to the fact that they demand that one should act without having any motive to act, which is of course causally impossible. But though Mrs. Freed's conclusion in this section is, I think, correct, and though she certainly succeeds in pointing to self-contradictions within the writings of a number of moralists, her arguments are not always convincing. She ascribes to moralists generally positions which some moralists could, without inconsistency, decline to defend: she argues, for example, that the theories of moral sense and conscience can be reduced to the statement that "you ought to act as your conscience tells you that you ought to act" and therefore that these theories cannot validly arrive at any specific rules of conduct (p. 44). And she assumes rather too easily that Kant is the typical moralist, and that the antinomies that appear in his ethical writings are latent in all prescriptive ethics.

But what is the "social pragmatism" which Mrs. Freed proposes to substitute for moralism? It is not, as one is at first inclined to suspect, merely a restatement of utilitarianism, for although the general happiness is the end to which this "system of action principles" is to lead, Mrs. Freed is not saying that this general happiness either is or ought to be everyone's goal: the imperatives she states are strictly hypothetical. She is only saying, for example, that if one desires the general happiness one should try to eradicate moralism. And I think that by abandoning the attempt to treat happiness as a necessary end she is able to give a more satisfactory account of it than a Utilitarian could. What is particularly interesting, and also particularly open to question, is her claim that this socially pragmatic system is already the one in accordance with which most ordinary people are thinking when they call things good or bad, and that most people are not really stating a categorical imperative on most occasions when they use the word "ought". She admits that most of us sometimes experience irrational feelings of this moral kind, but asks why we should "set a halo on our hallucinations and make humble obeisance to the little madman within our breast" (p. 223). Now

I should have thought that moralism was much more deeply imbedded in human thought and behaviour than this: for example, I should maintain that a linguistic moralism is an important part of linguistic behaviour, and Timasheff is probably not far wrong in maintaining that law, while it rests partly on force, also rests partly on what he calls ethics, that is, on what Mrs. Freed would call moralism. Again, while many people no doubt *say* that they judge actions by their effect on the general happiness, this principle normally serves as a *justification* of particular policies, and it can so serve both because it is vague and because it can appear—along Utilitarian lines of thought—as a necessary end. If so, then social pragmatism is unlikely to “make it possible to apply reason single-mindedly to the working out and co-ordinating of policies all directed to one single end” (p. 174), since the appearance of agreement on this end is illusory.

Mrs. Freed makes some good points about the propagandist use of moralism by preachers and so on—for example, that by persuading people that they should act without motives, that is in a way in which no one can act, the preacher is able to instil into his hearers a sense of their own guilt and inadequacy, and can so make them more pliable, more ready to obey his instructions. But I feel that Mrs. Freed’s account of the effects of moralism is vitiated by her failure to realise how pervasive it is. And, in conclusion, it seems a pity, when you have disposed of moralism, to put in its place nothing more exciting than universal benevolence.

JOHN MACKIE.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN AN ENGLISH MIDDLETOWN. By Hermann Mannheim. (Kegan Paul, 1948. xi + 131 pp.) Price (U.K), 12s. 6d.

The “English Middletown” is Cambridge, which is not entirely a Middletown, but has “to a surprising extent still preserved the atmosphere of a quiet country town”. In view of certain queries about the usefulness of purely statistical studies of juvenile delinquency in the nation as a whole—“statistical mass enquiries”—on the one hand, and the difficulty of psychological case-study which is both extensive and deep on the other, Dr. Mannheim feels that another sort of enquiry is necessary. This is “the *sociological* study of delinquency on regional lines, usually described as the *ecology* of delinquency” (see pp. 2-3). He distinguishes among British local studies already made, collections of data relating to a locality, and studies in the nature of social surveys focussed on delinquency, or again, studies relating to causal factors, and those dealing with methods of treatment, or official as opposed to private investigations. He remarks that neither the present study nor any previous one

gives the "complete picture of the relationship between the local delinquency position and social and economic factors which [is] . . . the ultimate aim of researches of this kind" (p. 6). The reasons for this book appear to be, in fact, that regional research ought to be done, and that Cambridge granted hospitality to the London School of Economics during the last war, and was accordingly a convenient place to study.

The study covers: (1) an account of the general setting, (2) an analysis of pre-war and war-time probation and supervision cases, (3) methods of treatment locally in use, and (4) special problems (relating to recidivism and delinquent girls). The whole ends with findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

A large portion of the material is a sample of 109 pre-war and 123 war-time cases (boys) from the local Juvenile Court. Allowing for the deficiencies of material collected for "purely practical purposes" (see p. 19), this material has been painstakingly analysed. Liberal use has been made of qualitative material from probation officers' reports and from those responsible for institutions, official or voluntary, to which cases have proceeded. There is constant (and useful) citation from the work of Banister and Ravden relating to the same area, and regular and careful comparison with other local studies—in Bradford, Coventry, Lincoln, and Portsmouth.

Among the principal findings are these: about a third of all cases come from broken homes; the families concerned had, on the average, more than four children; a considerable number of these families had more than one delinquent child; the percentage of illegitimate children was fairly high; the accommodation per head, at home, was less than that for the population of Cambridge as a whole; there was an increased war-time tendency for delinquents to come from the lower occupational strata; most of the boys concerned had to work in blind-alley jobs; gangs of delinquents were comparatively rare; about 93 per cent. of the charges were of an economic character.

These are roughly the things that everyday observation might lead us to expect. The study gives cause for some disquiet in the following findings: in a number of cases no school record was available to the Juvenile Court; information about physical health was often scanty and out of date; psychological or psychiatric examination was not ordered as frequently as appeared to be necessary; probation officers had excessive case loads during the war (unfortunately unavoidable); there was not sufficient information about girl delinquents to permit any definite conclusions.

Generally, however, Dr. Mannheim draws a favourable picture—the less favourable features have been concentrated here. In

addition to some obvious points about improved facilities and personnel, he makes certain general recommendations: for example, amplification and wider circulation of Chief Constables' reports, more comprehensive Juvenile Court records, wider use of psychological examination, and improved disposal and treatment of cases. "Our principal plea", he says, "is for more effective co-operation between the many agencies responsible for dealing with juvenile delinquency" (p. 14).

Much of this may sound obvious; but the complexity of English administration relating to young persons, with its local variations and its interweaving of statutory and voluntary provision, demands that information of this kind should be collected, and recommendations supported by argument for many local areas. This is particularly the case when, as now, English administration as a whole is developing, both in scope and in function, at a rate seldom if ever experienced in the past. At such a time every possible source of evidence must be tapped to enable temporary "teething troubles" to be distinguished from possible causes of permanent difficulty.

In assembling such evidence Dr. Mannheim has done a notable service. But might not *sociological* work on delinquency on regional lines go much farther? In the setting studied, Dr. Mannheim was handicapped by the lack of a recent general social survey. Even so, need it have been left merely as a schoolmaster's remark that "temptation provided by so many undergraduates with apparently much more time and money to spare than the ordinary working-class lad" (p. 47) is a likely cause of delinquency? A situation like this, where a dominant occupational interest, so to speak, is present in a given area, and carries certain connotations, real or imagined, of status or social expectation, is the very field the sociologist desires for more searching study. Not all undergraduates are ignorant of this problem. Further, comparison with other areas, for example, where ship-building, mining, or some particular heavy industry predominates, and those connected with it occupy a position different from that of other people in the community, could scarcely fail to be fruitful.

In general, however, it may be said that Dr. Mannheim has provided a distinguished addition to the series of local studies already published, and it is to be hoped that many more of like calibre will follow as quickly as possible.

J. A. CARDNO.

ADOLESCENCE—ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By C. M. Fleming. (Kegan Paul, 1948. vii + 262 pp.) Price (U.K.), 16s.

The sub-title of Dr. Fleming's comprehensive work continues ". . . with an Introduction to recent findings from the fields of

Anthropology, Physiology, Medicine, Psychometrics and Sociometry". The author says in his Foreword, too, that many current methods of handling young people "find their justification only in the somewhat mythical descriptions of past centuries". He has tried "to bring together in accessible form relevant findings from long-term studies of human development, from anthropological records of differing social patterns, and from observation of the therapeutic effects of group membership in schools, in the armed forces, and in industry . . . a full appreciation of their significance seems likely to lead to rather remarkable modifications in current procedure" (p. vii). This indicates the wide scope of the book and its practical aim. The reader will at once be on his guard against expecting profound or revolutionary theorising. Presumably his next concern will be to see how much of Dr. Fleming's book is specifically psychological, and how the extra-psychological material relates to social psychology proper.

Considered in this way, the headings of the three parts are not very revealing: "The Adolescent at Home", "The Adolescent at School", and "On the Threshold of Maturity". One can be certain that they have popular appeal, but one learns little from them about the approach. Of the seven chapters in the first part, those in which we might best look for a psychological approach are V, "Psychological Needs and Adolescent Attitudes"; VII, "Emotional Maturing"; and VIII, "Parent-Child Relationships". Chapter V is the one where we might expect the most thorough-going psychological handling. Dr. Fleming's treatment of psychological needs covers a brief résumé of approaches to the adolescents' awareness of "changes in their wishes and consequent modifications in their attitudes towards parents and their relatives" (p. 44). The author moves from a succinct though sweeping criticism of the approaches current in the era of McDougall, Freud and Stanley Hall—"it encouraged the acceptance as inevitable and universal of the pattern of behaviour then observable in California, in Vienna, or in London" (*loc. cit.*)—to an emphasis on the comparative-cultural approach, and the treatment of individuals in terms of their social needs. This looks like a programme for a social-psychological study with some emphasis on the side of sociology and anthropology. Whether we consider the discussion which follows as social psychology or as something else under that name will depend on just what is meant by "need" and "attitude", and how the material is handled.

Now Dr. Fleming says, at p. 45, "the conception of need is essentially more social in its implications than is a description of human behaviour in terms of instincts . . . It directs attention from the individual to his society, and to the means by which the group

may modify its methods with the expectation of resultant changes in his reactions." The needs actually discussed are those for acceptance by the group, for giving as well as receiving, for experiencing fresh adventures, for understanding, for exercising responsibility. As kinds of experience likely to be useful to the adolescent, or as categories of "social deprivation", so to say, from which delinquent adolescents have been found to suffer, these "needs" will do very well. But they do not bring us nearer to comprehending what occurs in the individual to cause delinquent behaviour when the "need for acceptance", say, is not satisfied. Dr. Fleming, in other words, approaches his social psychology in a way which makes it sociology, or something very near it.

Clearly there is a wide range of extra-psychological material to be dealt with; Chapter X, on "Bodily Changes", and Chapter XIII, on "Social Engineering in the School Setting", are useful examples. The discussion of bodily changes is closely integrated with the psychology of adolescence, though it is at a fairly popular level. The emphasis is on the extent and complexity of individual variations in the adolescent, the inadequacy of typological classifications, the defects of the statistics formerly employed, and the possible damage to adjustment in the adolescent that may result from expecting comparative uniformity. There is some discussion of group expectations and their importance to the adolescent, particularly the parents' contribution to smooth transition from childhood to maturity. The author's point of view is particularly clear in the following example: "... in connection with the reactions of adolescents to their growth changes in bodily build, facial outline, and distribution of fat. Their responses appear to correspond less to differences of sex or age than to differences in the suggestions and the social pressure to which they have been subjected" (p. 16). This chapter, in fact, deals comprehensively with the bodily changes of adolescence as they cause repercussions from the social environment on the individual and consequent changes in him.

One would expect Chapter XIII, from its title, to be as exclusively sociological as any. In fact, the author strikes a balance between sociology and social psychology comparable to that between social psychology and physiology in Chapter X. The theme is the school setting in relation to adolescence conceived as "a development towards that blending of attitudes which characterises the mentally healthy adult who is able to accept himself as both follower and leader, popular and unpopular, the same and different" (p. 179). The school setting is related to development in theories of learning—educability of the human environment is stressed—individual differences among pupils, and the treatment of misdemeanours through the interpretation of the individual in the light of his history and his social relationships.

Our concern has been largely with the approach, since the decision to deal with the psychological rather than the sociological aspects of adolescence will be important in determining the way in which the material is marshalled and the degree of detail in which the various portions of it are treated. Generally, this book is classified by the publishers as sociology, is largely sociology, and is described in its title as social psychology. The psychology, social or general, tends to appear where one might least expect it, and the social psychology does not seem to be the best part of the book. However, one's final impression is that the synthetic part of the book—the relation of much scattered material from a number of disciplines—has been well done, that the author's practical experience and caution have prevented him from pushing his conclusions too far, and that much of the discussion of his last chapter, on "Adolescents with Problems", will be of great help to workers in the field. There seem, indeed, to be two main uses for a work of this kind. It may be either our introduction to the study of the field, or a repository of practical advice for teachers or social workers who have covered some of the ground and wish to be kept up to date. Dr. Fleming's book should be helpful on the whole to readers of either class.

J. A. CAEDNO.

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS TODAY. Edited by Sándor Lorand. (George Allen and Unwin, 1948. 395 pp.) Price (U.K.), 25s.

Dr. Lorand has brought together twenty-nine essays which are meant "to depict the progress in psycho-analytic work and to give to psychiatrists, medical men, social workers, educators and others to whom the problems of contemporary life are important, a comprehensive survey of the contributions of psycho-analysis to the healing sciences and general culture". The "healing sciences" come first; the emphasis throughout is practical. Fritz Wittels has only ten pages in which to discuss *Psychoanalysis and Literature*, whereas Gregory Zilboorg is allowed as much as thirteen for his essay on *Manic-depressive Psychoses*.

It is not clear which of the essays were written for inclusion in this volume; even in those cases where they certainly were not (such as Ferenczi's *Freud's Influence on Medicine*) the editor has not thought it necessary to indicate the original place, or date, of publication. But certainly they show no sign of having been subordinated to a general plan. The general effect is that of a digest rather than of a serious book; as one would expect from their brevity, most of the essays are shallow and superficial. As a systematic account of recent developments in psycho-analysis, this volume will not do. It may, however, help the general reader (assuming that

he can surmount formidable linguistic barriers and is not repelled by what will seem to him quite arbitrary assumptions) to realise how widely psycho-analysis casts its nets; and the more experienced reader will note occasional points of interest in such essays as Ophuijsen on *Organic Psychoses*, Kenworthy on *Psychoanalytic Social Work* and Simmel on *War Neuroses*.

J. A. PASSMORE.

CLINICAL STUDIES IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY. By Henry V. Dicks. (Edward Arnold and Co., London, Second edition, 1947. 238 pp.) Price (U.K.), 15s.

THIS book consists of a collection of sixty-one case histories used by the author as a basis for expounding his viewpoint on the ætiology of neurotic illness. He does not discuss any psychotic syndromes, but confines his treatment to anxiety states, phobias, obsessional states, hysteria, some perversions of sexual aim and function, and drug addictions. The treatment of these syndromes is effected by elaboration and interpretation of the underlying psychodynamics of the case histories presented.

In his introductory chapter he makes a plea for eclecticism in the theory of psychopathology. What he mainly desires here is licence for free use of whatever he finds useful in the writings of the *analysts*. Freud is clearly his main stimulus, and is acknowledged as such, but in places he finds Jung and Adler both valuable. Any "eclecticism" he shows has thus a marked analytic bias, and this orientation is revealed throughout the book.

The author insists that his book is "not to be regarded as a primer, but rather as a text for discussion and critical evaluation" by those well acquainted with the "concepts and terminology of the major modern schools of psychopathology". While his book may be useful in this connection, it certainly requires considerable supplementation for anyone seeking a systematic account of psychodynamic principles.

The second edition was prepared after the author's return from military service. He states that in practice during the war he found it unnecessary to make any major changes in his views on psychopathology as already published (1939). There are in consequence only minor modifications in the new edition.

I. K. WATERHOUSE.

AROUND THE JOURNALS

LOGIC: D. R. Cousin (*Mind*, 233) criticises three theories of truth that he finds in Carnap, and insists on the pragmatic function of the word "true", that is, its function of expressing and/or inducing states

of mind; P. T. Geach takes Carnap to task for lack of rigour in the use of symbols (*Mind*, 232). J. E. Moyal discusses, from a mathematical point of view, the relevance of modern physical theories to the question of determinism (*Philosophy*, 91). In *Mind* (233) there is a very thorough Critical Notice by C. D. Broad of Kneale's *Probability and Induction*; the same book is reviewed more briefly by E. Whittaker in *Philosophy* (91), where E. A. Milne reviews Max Born's *Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance*. A. Duncan-Jones (*Analysis*, 13) says that propositions that refer to events have the odd feature that the same proposition cannot be entertained twice, since such a proposition involves a statement of the relation between the time of the event and the time of entertainment; in *Analysis* (14) F. Walsmann discusses analytic and synthetic judgments, starting from Kant and proceeding to certain features of definitions.

EPISTEMOLOGY: R. Firth (*Mind*, 232-3) argues that the Percept Theory does not settle the basic problems of epistemology, but does require some modifications to traditional views—for example, "sense-data" must be replaced by "ostensible physical objects"; A. C. Lloyd (*Mind*, 233) argues against the view that a sense-datum language has a certain primacy (as compared with "scientific" or physical object language). Russell's *Human Knowledge* is critically reviewed by Norman Malcolm (*Philosophical Review*, 349).

MORAL PHILOSOPHY: S. Hampshire (*Mind*, 232) finds certain fallacies current in recent ethical discussions (for example, the assimilation of moral to descriptive judgments, and the belief that moral judgments must be ultimate and irrational because they cannot be logically derived from statements of fact) and associates them with a mistaken concentration on the problems of the moral judge rather than those of the moral agent. *Philosophy* has several articles on moral questions: W. B. Gallie (91) suggests that it would be more illuminating to bring out the conflicts between moral systems than to try to arrive at a single true moral system and to explain disagreements away; N. H. G. Robinson (91) examines the relation between the "objective" and "subjective" moral situations; Sydney Hooper (92) links Alexander's theory of morality with Whitehead's metaphysical notion of "order"; R. Corkey (92) re-asserts the intuitionist doctrine. In *Analysis* (14) Pepita Haezrahi defends J. S. Mill's often criticised dictum about the desirable and the desired. In *Philosophical Review* (349) S. M. Brown and H. J. Paton discuss Paton's interpretation of Kant's *Grundlegung*.

SCHOLARSHIP: R. Robinson (*Philosophical Review*, 349) suggests that the Forms are absent from Plato's *Theaetetus* merely because they are irrelevant, and that Plato's treatment of error in this dialogue is vitiated by the assumption that thinking is sensing without

organs; G. Vlastos, in the same number, discusses the interpretation of the physical theory of Anaxagoras; R. S. Bluck (*Philosophical Review*, 347) replies to George Boas's arguments against the authenticity of Plato's *Seventh Letter*.

VARIOUS: In *Mind* (232) A. Hatto discusses the usefulness of "revolution" as a historical term, and J. J. C. Smart questions the appropriateness of the metaphor referring to time as a river; B. Mayo (*Mind*, 233) asks whether there is a sense of duration. C. D. Broad (*Philosophy*, 91) asserts the relevance of psychical research to various philosophical issues. Sorokin's *The Reconstruction of Humanity* is reviewed by R. Gotesky in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (10, 2) and by J. A. Irving in *Philosophical Review* (349), and H. Cairns's *Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel* is reviewed by F. S. Cohen (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, 10, 4). A. Flew (*Analysis*, 13) argues that when Freud speaks of unconscious mental processes he is offering an explanation in terms of motives as if it were an explanation in terms of efficient causes, whereas motives, being "intangible and insubstantial", cannot be causes. In the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* (29, 4) S. Nacht reports on clinical manifestations of aggression, while J. C. Moloney says that intolerance (including racial prejudice) is caused by authoritarianism; in the same *Journal* (29, 3) E. Jones returns briefly to the problem of *Hamlet*. In *Journal of Philosophy* (46, 26) R. H. Bowen reviews the translation by Fisch and Bergin of Vico's *New Science*; R. Cumming reviews six books on Existentialism. In the same *Journal* (47, 2) Iredell Jenkins reviews *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, while Helen M. Lynd discusses what is required for true objectivity in the study of history.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention in this list neither precludes nor guarantees later review.)

THE ESSENTIALS OF THEISM. By D. J. B. Hawkins. (Sheed and Ward, 1949. 151 pp.) Price (U.K.), 7s. 6d.

This book "tries to show how we make the logical transition from the world of experience to uncaused being", and also sketches the history of the various theistic arguments.

THE DRAMA OF ATHEIST HUMANISM. By Henri de Lubac, S.J. (Sheed and Ward, 1949. x + 253 pp.) Price (U.K.), 15s.

The author surveys the doctrines of Feuerbach, Comte, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Dostoevsky, finding in them a movement away from and then back to God.

EXISTENCE AND ANALOGY. By E. L. Mascall. (Longmans, 1949. xix + 188 pp.) Price (Aust.), 14s. 9d.

A study of the foundations of natural theology.

MY PHILOSOPHY. By Benedetto Croce. (George Allen and Unwin, 1949. 240 pp.) Price (U.K.), 15s.

A number of (mainly brief) essays on moral and political problems.

TOWARDS A FREE PRESS. (Fabian Society of N.S.W., 1949. 24 pp.) Price (Aust.), 1s.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF COMMON SENSE. By Nathan Isaacs. (Kegan Paul, 1949. vii + 208 pp.) Price (U.K.), 15s.

A study from the point of view of child psychology of basic questions in the theory of knowledge.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO. By G. C. Field. (Home University Library, O.U.P., 1949. 219 pp.) Price (U.K.), 5s.

DIFFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By A. Anastasi and J. P. Foley, Jr. (Macmillan, 1949. xv + 894 pp.)

A revised and enlarged edition of the original work by A. Anastasi.

EXPERIMENTA PSYCHOLOGICA. By Edgar Rubin. (Ejnar Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 1949. 356 pp.) Price, Dan. kr. 24.80.

A reprint of articles in various languages.

BEYOND REALISM AND IDEALISM. By Wilbur Marshall Urban. (George Allen and Unwin, 1949. 266 pp.) Price (U.K.), 18s.

The theme of this book is that the opposition in modern philosophy between realism and idealism is both fatal and unnecessary, and should be transcended.

PSYCHOLOGISCHE KATEGORIALISTIK—EINE NEUE WISSENSCHAFT (EIN PROGRAMM). By B. Germansky. (Hamadpis Liphshitz Press, Jerusalem, 1949. 8pp.)

NOTES AND NEWS.

AUSTRALASIAN ASSOCIATION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

ANNUAL CONGRESS, 1950.

The Annual Congress for 1950 will be held at the University of Melbourne from August 17 to 21. The Annual General Meeting will be held at 7.30 p.m. on Friday, August 17.